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Chapter 1
On Tribe and Tribalism
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Introduction
The field of comparative politics operates on several levels one of which is
institutionalism, and often has been the case that a top-down approach in which the state
and only formal institutions has been the subject of study. This has set a norm that
defined those state-societal relations as a one way direction where the formal (state)
governs the informal (society). Some scholars however, argued that informal institutions
also play an important role in this relationship and tried to dissect informal structure and
investigate their prominence1. This was attempted in regions like Latin America, Eastern
Europe and recently in the Middle East where informal structures like clientelism, civil
society, and patronage has played a role in defining state-societal relations. The study of
informal structures has resurfaced the literature produced on the Middle East with the
awaking of the Arab Spring therefore highlighting the role of informal structures like the
youth, civil societies, and Ultras groups.
In the context of the Middle East little if any emphasize was directed towards tribalism as
an informal societal structure that plays a role in the state-societal relations. One integral
societal structure that would help in understanding the internal dynamics of the Middle
East is looking at the tribal structure that has reemerged to be a unique factor is dissecting
state-societal structures.

1. Helmke. G and Levitsky S. 2004: 734. “Since James March and Johan P. Olsen declared that “a
new institutionalism has appeared in political science,” research on political institutions has advanced
considerably. Yet because the comparative politics literature has focused primarily on formal institutions,
it risks missing many of the “real” incentives and constraints that underlie political behavior… We have
sought to provide a framework for incorporating informal rules into mainstream institutional analysis.”
(Informal Institutions and Comparative Politics: A Research Agenda) in Perspectives on Politics.
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Research Problem
Having mentioned the fact that the informal structure of the tribe is understudied opens a
Pandora Box and offers a plethora of questions to be explored while conducting a study
in the Middle East. When the concept of the tribe is mentioned within the context of the
Middle East certain instances in the literature were highlighted and therefore established
an understanding of the tribe that is not applicable to all cases. For example; the basis of
tribal structure in Libya is completely different to that in Iraq, with the former relying in
kinship ties, while the latter has an element of sectarianism. The conceptualization of the
tribe and tribalism also presumed the state-tribal relations. Without thorough analytical
study of this informal structures scholars tend to prematurely define the state-tribal
relation as conflictual in nature like in Yemen or cooperative like in Jordan without
studying this overlaying societal structure. Some presumptions also give a negative
connotation to the concept of tribalism and always associate it with backwardness and
primitivism. Therefore, in order to test these presumptions this research will revisit the
concept of the tribe and tribalism within the context of the Middle East, and investigate
state (formal) - tribal (informal) interaction through evaluating the case of Yemen during
the rule of President Ali Abdullah Saleh. However, as my research highlights this sphere
of interaction it will focus mainly on the way it affects official politics. This study aims to
answer the research question of: Did tribalism govern the relationship between the
tribe and the state in Yemen during rule of Saleh 1978 - 2011?
In trying to answer this question, comparative historical analysis will be conducted while
testing the following hypothesis: Tribalism has persisted as an informal structure that
governed the state's official internal politics during the rule of Saleh in Yemen. In
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this single case study tribal structure appears as a prominent actor in the state-societal
relations and influenced state internal policies. In the next section this universe of
interaction between the state and the tribe will be explored in general and later would
focus on Yemen as a case that can tease out answers to the following questions: what is
the tribe and tribalism in the Yemeni context? How does tribal structure interact with the
state? This research aims to disentangle the dynamics that govern the state-tribal
constellation, and project how it has changed through time, if it did.
Literature on Tribalism and State-Tribal Relations in the Middle East
When we explore the scholarship on tribes and tribalism we find diverse definitions and
meanings provided by anthropologists, sociologists and political scientists. It is worth
noting that the definitions differ from region to another; the notion of a tribe in Africa is
not the same as that in the Middle East for example, and that has contributed to the
vagueness of the terms 'tribe' and 'tribalism'. Firstly, what is a tribe? And what is
tribalism? Lapidus stated that the concept of tribe is "unclear and controversial" holding
that it can be used to refer to "a kinship group, an extended family, or a coalition of
related families" leaving the term open and loose to all sorts of groupings.2 An
anthropologist seconds that statement and maintained that "the nature of the concept of
tribe has been a confusing and ambiguous one from its earliest period of utterance" and
therefore conforming to the vagueness of the term.3 As this section progresses it will

2. Ira M. Lapidus, “Tribes and State formation in Islamic History,” in Tribes and State Formation in the
Middle East, ed. Philip S. Khoury , and Joseph Kostiner (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1990),
26.
3. Leon Sheleff, “Tribalism- Vague but Valid,” in The Future of Tradition: Customary Law, Common
Law and Legal Pluralism (New York: Routledge, 2009), 38.
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display some of the definitions of the tribe and tribalism in the existing literature of
anthropology, ethnography and political science in an attempt to refine and better
conceptualize the term. What is important to note is that the previous definitions are
mostly Eurocentric and cannot be applied to regions like the Middle East as sources of
examining the social and economic basis of tribal systems are limited, or provided by an
outside who cannot escape biases.4
Now after attempting to refine the tribe as a term, the concept of tribalism must be
clarified in relation to politics. In general, tribalism is known as "acting or causing action
on basis of membership of a specific tribe or family".5 Another scholar defined tribalism
as "the manifestation of over-riding group loyalties by members of a culturally affiliated
society to locally based interests which involve tradition, land, and opportunities for
survival and growth".6 If the latter condensed definition of tribalism is evaluated one can
locate the rational language of 'interests', 'opportunities', 'survival and growth' that can
translate in political terms to be the optimal gains of the tribe as a structure. Tapper better
redefines this tribal structure in the context of the Middle East as "a state of mind, and a
construction of reality, a model of organization and action".7 In order for this notion of
tribalism to make sense in the context of the Middle East, historical episodes of
interaction between the tribal structure and other formal structures- namely the states4. Richard Tapper, “Anthropologists, Historians, and Tribespeople on Tribes and State Formation in
the Middle East,” in Tribes and State Formation in the Middle East, ed. Philip S, Khoury, and Joseph
Kostiner (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1990), 56.
5. Nikolaos Van Dam, The Struggle for Power in Syria: Politics and Society Under Asad and the Ba'th
Party (Bloomsberry Academic, 1996), 167.
6. Sheleff, “Tribalism- Vague but Valid,” 50.
7. Tapper, “Anthropologists, Historians, and Tribespeople,” 56.
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will be reviewed, to grasp a better definition of the term and its importance in
understanding the Middle East in a political and societal context. This will be fulfilled by
a detailed research that will generate an understanding on the state-societal universe,
based on the interaction between these two structures: the state and the tribe.
After reviewing these many definitions of the tribe we will have to bridge between the
two terms, the tribe and the state, at the same time differentiate between them in meaning.
One has to go back to the emergence of the state as a structure and try to evaluate how
the tribal structure managed to coexist with that of the state. Lapidus in his chapter Tribes
and State formation in Islamic History stated that there were three institutional structures
that dominated in the Middle East during the Islamic era namely, the ―tribal, religious,
and empire- later state – collectivities‖.8 These structures displayed a degree of
interrelation that modified and pushed each structure to evolve respectively. The Middle
East as a region cannot be evaluated using one of these institutions alone, but as Lapidus
maintained the tribe witnessed the great degree of ―construction, reconstruction and
deconstruction along with the imperial entities‖ present at the time.9 The tribe as an entity
is a societal structure band also a political (informal) structure that coexisted with the
empires, and states, at a later stage. In fact Lapidus maintained that the Middle East as a
system ―involved two types of political and cultural entities, often on the same territory,
competing for power and legitimacy‖.10

8. Lapidus, “Tribes and State formation in Islamic History,” 26.
9. Ibid., 27.
10. Ibid., 28.
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Machiavelli considered tribalism besides the two other elements of a strong military and
the incorporation of religion, when he compared between the success of the Ottomans
and the failure of Europe. Ibn Khaldun however made that notion of tribalism clear
through highlighting the term ‗asabiyya‘ which explains the ―natural cohesion when a
group is bound to administer and defend itself‖.11 Though this form of natural ―tribalurban‖ cohesion that was praised by Machiavelli when describing the Middle East,
Gellner in his article titled Tribalism and State in the Middle East mentioned that this
cohesion was tested and maintained that tribalism did not weather away but ―reemerged
as the empire declined‖.12 Ever since the collapse of the Ottoman Empire severe changes
have occurred and Ibn Khaldun‘s ―three effective principles of political order: the natural
cohesion of tribal life; the principle of military-administrative slavery; and religion‖13
were all challenged as we saw tribes split and fight each other, warfare atomized, and
religion evolved.
The 20th century has carried a lot of changes to the Middle East and Bassem Tibi in his
text titled Old Tribes and Imposed Nation-States argued that these changes with the
concepts of ―nation-states‖ and ―sovereignty‖ challenged tribalism and created a deep
contradiction between the tribe and the state.14 This does not imply that the tribe will

11. Ernest Gellner, “Tribalism and the State in the Middle East," in Tribes and State Formation in the
Middle East, ed. Philip S, Khoury, and Joseph Kostiner (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1990),
123.
12. Ibid., 125.
13. Ibid., 122.
14. Bassam Tibi, “Nation-State in the Modern Middle East,” in Tribes and State Formation in the
Middle East, ed. Philip S, Khoury, and Joseph Kostiner (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1990),
127.
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have to submit to the state and lose its autonomy because in some instances the tribes
―become holders of state power‖ like in Saudi Arabia and in some other instances they
get integrated into the modern nation-state like in Jordan.15 Tribalism was not erased but
rather integrated, challenged or oppressed by the concept of nation-state and Watt
maintained that even the prophet Mohamed when establishing the new Islamic Umma ―
he brought unity but did not overcome the tribal element as rivalries were only
subdued‖.16 This can only mean that the tribal identity persisted with the rising notion of
the Islamic Umma and still persisted with the modernization of the Middle East as
Hudson puts it ―the tribal way of life has been waning, however a far large portion of the
Arab population retains a degree of tribal identity‖.17
The complex relationship between the tribe and the states was investigated by many
scholars two of whom are Khoury and Kostiner who presented that the two entities will
either try to ―sustain each other or seek to destroy each other‖ depending on various other
factor.18 This interplay can vary from employing tribalism to take charge of marginalized
areas in the deserts and mountains or rather, as Tapper noted: ―control the tribes by
nominating leaders, keeping chiefly members as hostages, establishing marriage alliances
between chiefly and royal families, or fostering dissension between rivals for

15. Ibid.
16. Tibi, “Nation-State in the Modern Middle East,” 134.
17. Ibid., 136.
18. Philip S, Khoury, and Joseph Kostiner, “Tribes and Complexities of State Formation in the Middle
East,” in Tribes and State Formation in the Middle East, ed. Philip S, Khoury, and Joseph Kostiner (Los
Angeles: University of California Press, 1990), 7.
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leadership‖.19 The response of the tribe will either be to comply or resist the centralized
administration but ―Arabian-style tribes were not perceived as major threats to the
stability of the states‖ as Barfield claims. He further points that ―they were only marginal
in terms of political control, for there was constant interaction between tribes and states
in trades, and they share similar culture and religious traditions‖.20
The interaction between the state and the tribe was not limited to the period of state
formation but evolved with the regimes ruling in the Arab region. Many scholars
discussed the political influence of tribalism in consolidating or maintaining the
authoritarian rule of state in the Arab region. Kostiner in Tribe and State in Saudi Arabia
highlights that ―tribal modes of behavior and values [tribalism] prevailed in society
alongside new state institutions and bureaucratic procedures‖ and were regarded as a
necessary political power for the expansion of the Saudi state.21 Paul Dresch, an expert
in the Yemeni affairs, expressed that tribalism has always been a factor in determining
the fate of the new nation-state to an extent ―it was heavily involved in the proxy war
between Cairo and Riyadh in 1967‖ as they would rally troops in return for enormous
amounts of cash from both sides.22 Tribalism in fact constituted a major role in the

19. Khoury and Kostiner, “Tribes and Complexities of State Formation,” 13.
20. Thomas J. Barfield, “Tribe and State Relations: The Inner Asian Perspective,” in Tribes and State
Formation in the Middle East, ed. Philip S, Khoury, and Joseph Kostiner (Los Angeles: University of
California Press, 1990), 163.
21. Joseph Kostiner, “Transforming Dualities: Tribe and State Formation in Saudi Arabia,” in Tribes
and State Formation in the Middle East, ed. Philip S, Khoury, and Joseph Kostiner (Los Angeles: University
of California Press, 1990), 243.
22. Paul Dresch, “Imams and Tribes: The Writing and Acting of History in Upper Yemen,” in Tribes and
State Formation in the Middle East, ed. Philip S, Khoury, and Joseph Kostiner (Los Angeles: University of
California Press, 1990), 258.
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consolidation of rule in the Saudi state and helped shape the political sphere in the
Yemeni case. On the other hand, Anderson in Tribe and State: Libyan Anomalies
displayed that during the early days of Qaddafi who ―made it clear that he was opposed to
tribalism as a principle of political organization [and] restructured the administrative
units to free them from tribal sheiks‖ has contradicted himself by assigning members of
his own family to key positions and consequently, the small tribe of the Qadadfa
benefited from his position.23 Tribalism in the Iraqi state with the Ba‘athist regime,
which lacked sufficient legitimacy and representation of the different factions, was
reconstructed of and gave rise to new tribalism. The new tribalism coined by Jabar as
―Etatist tribalism; which is the process of integrating the tribal lineages and primordial
fictive systems into the state to enhance the political power of a certain vulnerable state
elite‖ served for some time and was once again reconstructed.24
This literature on tribal structure and its interplay with the state in the Middle East
partially reviewing the phase of modern state formation and the phase of power
consolidation by Arab regimes helps in illustrating the integral role of the tribal structure.
It further clarifies the notion of tribalism as an informal societal structure during different
episodes of history. It is important at this point to clarify that this thesis will adopt an
institutionalist perspective when looking at the state, making clear distinctions between
formal and informal structures. This account on the early interaction between the state
(formal) and the tribal (informal) poses questions on whether this interaction is displayed
23. Lisa Anderson, “Tribe and State: Libyan Anomalies,” in Tribes and State Formation in the Middle
East, ed. Philip S, Khoury, and Joseph Kostiner (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1990), 297.
24. Faleh Jaber, “Sheikhs and Ideologues: Deconstruction and Reconstruction of Tribes under
Patrimonial Totalitarianism in Iraq, 1968-1998," in Tribes and Power Nationalism and Ethnicity in the
Middle East, ed. Faleh, Jabar and Hosham Dawood (London: Saqi Books, 2003), 71.
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as a result of power relations between the two entities. At this stage, many questions are
left unanswered, like; does the tribal structure influence the state policies? Can the tribal
structure be integrated within the state structure, or in other words formalized? These
questions and the role of tribalism, as an informal structure of organization and
collectiveness with its attributes to the political context, remain to be a gap in scholar
literature. Therefore, an extensive research will try to answers these questions and will
attempt to explore tribalism and its interaction with the state in the Middle East through
studying the case of Yemen.
Tribalism in Yemen
As detailed in previous section, various definitions are assigned to the concept of the tribe
and tribalism in general, but as the scope of this research has been narrowed down to
studying the case of Yemen the concepts of the tribe and tribalism within the context of
Yemen need to be explained. The uniqueness and sensitivity of the concepts can be
spotted in the literature that has been produces on Yemen societal structures. Lisa
Wedeen an expert in Yemen‘s civil society, in Peripheral Visions has strongly discarded
the common definition of the tribe, as kinship group acting on basis of affiliation, and it's
applicability in Yemen by stating, "tribes often denote territorial political arrangements
made up of (grain and qat) farmers or ranchers living in villages".25 Swagman further
emphasized that "the Qabili (tribesman) is still a fighter when faced by the threat of too
much outside control, or in a way if his person, property or family is in some way

25. Lisa Wadeen, Peripheral Visions: Publics, Power and Performance in Yemen (Chicago: The
University of Chicago Press, 2008), 171.
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slighted".26 Another contextualization of the concept of tribe - qabilah- is offered by
Blumi in stating that "the qabilah in a Yemeni context, actually constitute social and
political units within a given territory that do not neatly fit within a presumed social
hierarchy mediated by local laws –urf- and loyalty claims that completely ignore
numerous local contingencies".27
Wedeen in describing the categories that identify politics and conflict in Yemen stressed
that "tribal affiliation is one component of sociopolitical identification for many
Yemenis, and this is especially true in areas where the state is institutionally weak".28
These areas are mainly in the Highlands of Yemen like the provinces of Sada'a, Amraan
or Aljawf, but there also exists a different understanding of the tribe and tribalism in the
hinterland and the middle regions which was echoed by some scholars. Blumi through
reviewing the works of Dresch pointed out that the tribal bodies did not comply with the
notion of "collective political action" but rather had "no fixed moral focus"29, therefore
adding to the complexity of the concept of the tribe in Yemen. Wedeen in a section titled
"The vexed category of the Tribe" also expressed that "people in the middle region, do
not identify as tribal, although, mirroring certain practices attributed to tribes, they do
have important extended family relationships, carry arms and settle disputes out of

26. Charles Francis Swagman, “Social Organization and Local Development in the Western Central
Highlands of the Yemen Arab Republic,” (PhD diss., University of California Los Angeles, 1985), 73.
27. Isa Blumi, Chaos in Yemen: Societal Collapse and the New Authoritarianism (London: Routledge.
2011), 23-24.
28. Wadeen, Peripheral Visions, 171.
29. Blumi, Chaos in Yemen, 24.

13

court".30 Arda quoted in Swagman's work mentioned how "the tribal- qabili- status is
maintained through the genealogical idiom and, more importantly, through adherence to a
tribal ethos –qabayla- which is the cultural code of morals and proscriptions for behavior
which defines the social status thus putting more emphasis on the tribal ethos than
genealogy in defining a tribesmen".31 These accounts and many more have added to the
complexity yet uniqueness of the terms tribe and tribalism in the Yemeni context, and
therefore establish the fact that tribalism is deeply embedded in the Yemeni traditions and
cultural norms. This notion of tribalism appears in every day politics in Yemen and is not
strictly a practice of the tribal elites –Shaykhs- but a practice performed by "individuals
(Shaykh, Imam,or Qadi) who command a hierarchical superstructure".32 Wadeen
maintained that "tribal identity is not fixed at birth; tribesmen can cease to be tribesmen
when they move away from tribal territory, and people can switch tribes‖, and this adds
to the fluidity of the concept of the tribe and tribalism.33 This research is designed to
expose the term tribalism through studying specific historical periods and locating its
interaction with the formal structures.
Theoretical Framework
Revisiting the research question of this study [Did tribalism govern the relationship
between the tribe and the state in Yemen during rule of Saleh?] leads to the next step
of conceptualizing the terms; tribalism, official politics, informal/ formal institutions. But
30. Wadeen, Peripheral Visions, 172.
31. Swagman, “Social Organization,” 73.
32. Blumi, Chaos in Yemen, 25.
33. Wadeen, Peripheral Visions, 173.
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first, one need to highlight that as institutionalism is the main school of thought that will
steer the progression of this research, the interaction of informal institutions with formal
institutions will be the cornerstone through which the research will offer an extension to
institutional analysis as school of thought. This approach will offer this research the
richness that can be teased out through analyzing these interactions and ultimately help in
understanding the real political behavior in Yemen. This section will also pinpoint the
key concepts and how these are employed throughout that research.
To start off, one needs to point a specific definition for the concepts that will appear
constantly throughout the study. This research study will rely on Morton Fried's
definitions of tribe and tribalism; the tribe as "the largest group within which warfare is
forbidden, distinguished by a common name and the exercise of force", and tribalism as "
the manifestation of over-riding group loyalties by members of a culturally affiliated
society to locally based interests which involve tradition, land, and opportunities for
survival and growth‖.34 The two definitions help in constructing the notion of the tribe as
homogenous structure, and locate the rational language of 'interests', 'opportunities',
'survival and growth' that will appear throughout the single-case historical analysis.
However, when using the term formal/informal institutions, Helmke and Levitsky's
definitions will be used in this research design. Both institutions are defined as follows;
formal ―Rules that are openly codified, in the sense that they are established and
communicated through channels that are widely accepted as official… and the informal
as "socially shared rules, usually unwritten, that are created, communicated, and

34. Sheleff, “Tribalism- Vague but Valid,” 50.

15

enforced outside of officially sanctioned channels".35 I chose to analyze tribalism in as
one of the informal structures in Yemen mirroring the work of some scholars with clans
and mafia as informal structures in Latin America. The difficult task in this research will
be in trying to define [official politics], and here I will be using Benedict Kerkvliet‘s
conceptualization of official politics that stated; ―official politics is one of those two. It
involves authorities in organizations making, implementing, changing, contesting, and
evading polices regarding resource allocation… Official politics also occurs in churches,
universities, corporations, political parties, non-governmental organizations, labor unions,
associations and revolutionary associations, where authorities are the primary actors‖
(Kerkvliet, 231).36 In using this definition of official politics the research will be
specifically targeting the sphere of interaction between the state as the authority and the
informal structure of the tribe and will categorize this interaction according to the
typology of formal-informal interaction as discussed in the section below.
Methodology
Helmke and Levitsky highlighted the role of informal institutions and the powerful
analysis that these structures can produce if studied rigorously. As stated in their research
agenda, ―informal institutions have always remained in the margins of comparative
politics and this risk in missing many of the real incentives and constraints of the political
behavior‖.37 Trying to engage the role of informal institutions in cases obtained from
35. Gretchen, Helmke and Steven Levitsky, “Introduction,” in Informal Institutions and Democracy:
Lessons from Latin America (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 2006), 5.
36. Benedict J. Tria Kerkvliet, “Everyday Politics in Peasant Societies (and Ours),” Journal of Peasant
Studies 36,1 (2009): 231.
37. Helmke and Levitsky, “Introduction,” 5.

16

Latin America provided another lens that helped in better understanding several arenas of
politics like; the executive-legislative relations, electoral politics, judicial politics and
political regimes. This research however; will emphasize on the importance of studying
informal institutions in the Middle East through presenting a historical analytical study of
the interaction between the state and tribalism as one integral informal institution.
Helmke and Levitsky proposed a wider scope of looking into this universe of interaction
between the formal and informal that is dependent on two dimensions; the effectiveness
of the formal and the compatibility of both institutions. In another words, instead of
looking at the interaction as ―problem-solving‖ or ―problem-creating‖ they uncover the
complexity of ―the informal institutions that seem to reinforce or substitute the very
formal institution they undermine‖38. This brought about a typology that defines the four
patterns of interaction between the informal and formal institutions. Helmke and Levitsky
list these interactions as follows; 1) complementary: one in which the informal ―fill in the
gaps‖ and boost the efficiency of the formal, 2)accommodative: exists when the formal is
effective but the actors choose the informal as ―a second best strategy‖ for rules that can‘t
be changed or broken to achieve a final good, 3)substitutive: occurs when the formal is
ineffective and the informal takes its place to achieve a common goal, 4)competing:
happens when ―goals are conflicting‖39. These interaction patterns project the many
possibilities of studying the informal institutions and how they have ―mutually
transformative effects‖.

38. Helmke and Levitsky, “Introduction,” 3-5.
39. Ibid., 13-16.
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As this study on the state (formal)-tribalism (informal) interaction progresses, the
typology of four patterns of formal-informal institutional interaction proposed by Helmke
and Levitsky will be utilized. These patterns will be located in a historical analysis
conduct on Yemen the single case study, and will later test the hypothesis raised in this
study. The center of this study will revolve around identifying the actors and their
interests in these interactions, and will try to identify the mechanisms of change, if any.
This will help in deriving an answer to the RQ: Did tribalism as an informal
structure governed state institutions to bring about the official politics during the
rule of Saleh. In conducting a historical analysis throughout the period of Saleh‘s rule in
Yemen, documented historical events will be evaluated, while engaging in a debatable
narrative that will answer the 'How' question. However, primary sources will be of major
importance to strengthen the analysis on the single case study and help a conclusion
leading to prospective research. Finally, this study will undertake only qualitative
historical analysis, as there is no data or statistics on the topic of tribalism in Yemen.
Research Advantages and Limitations
Conducting this research in Yemen will be a daunting task for any researcher trying to
infiltrate the fabric of the tribal structure; however a local researcher familiar with the
social dynamics will have the access to information. There will be barely any language
barrier as this research will thoroughly analyze a wide range of resources in English and
Arabic. Tracing the emergence of tribalism as an informal institution is difficult to
achieve due to the limited resources, thus reference will be made to the already existing
literature. Challenges may arises when a focal point is to be established as the existence
of the tribe and tribalism supposedly predates formal institutions, therefore the aim of this
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research is to study the period that is relevant to the political scene nowadays. The third
and more stressing challenge will be in trying to identify and measure tribalism as an
informal institution, hence; the scope of this study will try to focus on the political arena
where state should be present by default. At the current phase of the study field research
appears to be an almost impossible option due to the ongoing conflict, therefore instances
in which the interaction between the formal and informal resulting in different outcomes
will be at the core of this research.
Historical episodes will focus mainly on the state-societal interactions in the northern
Yemen, and this geographical specification was decided to offer an accurate account on
the tribal structure that can be different than the tribal structure in the southern or eastern
– mostly desert – tribal structure. The history of the southern Yemen and its tribal
structure offers another avenue of exploration that will not be the subject of this research.
Therefore this research, in its historical analysis sections below, will start with the Zaydi
rule in northern Yemen and underline the major historical events leading to the formation
of the modern state, and the rise of Ali Abdullah Saleh as president of the Yemen Arab
Republic (YAR) before the unification.
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Chapter 2
Historical background on State-Tribal Relations in Yemen

20

In the introductory chapter the basis of this research were laid out and an overview
presented the directions this research can take. State-tribal relations were explored on the
larger scope then were narrowed down and focused on Yemen as a case that will be
studied within the abovementioned framework. The path this research will undertake
requires an extensive historical background to highlight the overall importance of the
tribes in Yemen throughout different regime styles and to put the reader in perspective. It
would be difficult to trace back the history of the tribes in Yemen as they predate the
formation of the state by thousands of years, but few accounts of history relevant to the
study will be mentioned to reflect the influence of the tribal structure on ruling formal
structures.
Hence, this background will be divided into five sections, the first of which would
discuss the tribe during Zaydi rule in Northern Yemen and will form the take off point in
this analysis. Secondly, a section on the organization and leadership of the tribe will
display the internal dynamics within the tribe(s) and open the gates to conceptualizing
tribalism as an informal structure. Following that brief sections on the tribe and the first
republic will pinpoint the role of the tribe in the years of mayhem between the 1960s and
1970, and capture their dominance. Finally, a background on Ali Abdullah Saleh will be
provided illustrating how the tribesman has become the head of state; accordingly placing
the first piece of puzzle in order. Before proceeding into the sections of this chapter, the
below quote by Paul Dresch, speaks volumes about the universe yet to be explored;
“The tribes in any case have no unified story to tell, only the indefinitely
fragmented body of heroic tradition… We are engaged, inevitably, with a partial view
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that has been abstracted from a reality that may well be more complex; and what can be
tribal is what histories leave as their residue.”40
The Tribe and Zaydi rule in Yemen
Tribal existence in Yemen was not restricted to the Northern Highlands but they stretched
from the hill to the valley across Yemen‘s cultivated mountains and abandoned deserts.
However, as the Zaydi rule was well established in the North. Southern Yemen was
under the British imperial control, mainly the town and port of Aden, and the historical
accounts on the tribes living in southern Yemen are limited to the interaction that existed
between the sultans of the south and the colonial power. Northern Yemen was more
vibrant with tribal quarrels, documentation of tribal agreements and events which
presented a rich resource that could be reviewed and reflected upon. Therefore, choosing
to study tribes in the Northern Highlands is based on two factors; the availability of
historical accounts of tribes in the north during the Zaydi rule, and to showcase the tribal
interaction with the Imamate rule that was welcomed as formal structure back at the time.
Thus, this section will be focusing on the rise of the Zaydi rule in the Northern Highlands
and their interaction with the tribes in the region.
Yemeni historians claim that both the rise and fall of the Zaydi rule in Yemen was bound
to the rulers' established relations with the tribes. The stretching millennial relationship
between the tribe and the Zaydi state was both harmonious and conflicting. But as these
structures maintained their political and military presence, they established an internal
system of balance of power that governed this relationship, so no structure would be able
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to overrule the other.41 The political and tribal fiasco that existed in Yemen in the ninth
century set the basis for the establishment of the Zaydi rule in Yemen. Historical archives
claim that Imam Al-Hady (founder of the Zaydi rule), who was also a well known
religious scholar, met Yemeni tribal leaders during pilgrimage in Mecca, the latter
convinced him to come settle in Saada, Northern Yemen, and resolve their difference;
therefore, inaugurating the Zaydi rule in Yemen 897 AD.42
Taking a step back will help in understanding how the Imamate rule consolidated power
in Northern Yemen. Tribal leaders mainly from Hamdan believed that the best way to
put out the fire of an everlasting conflict is to appoint a neutral religious mediator to settle
their differences, and there came the role of Imam Al-Hady, founder of the Zaydi
religious sect and later a founder of a dynasty that grew roots in northern Yemen.43
Throughout his rule, Imam Al-Hadi won the tribal support necessary to start his vision of
a Zaydi state, and was wise enough in earning their trust to gain the political and military
support needed to widen the base of the Zaydi rule that lasted for almost a thousand
years.44 This shows how the tribal structure has played a key role in the rise and fall of
dynasties, and states south of the Arabian Peninsula. Though surviving for almost a
millennial, the state established by Al-Hady was weak and fragile as it fell in the swamp
of internal conflict either by the number of coups attempted by the rivalries within, or by
tribal uprisings against the unjust Imam of the throne, or facing outside threat. It is worth
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mentioning that as much as the tribes supported the establishment of the Zaydi rule it
was, in the contrary, much of an obstacle and threat to the stability and the welfare of the
Zaydi state as evident in the political scene and their relations with the different ruling
Imams.45 Various incidents will support these claims, and will illustrate how the tribe was
an independent structure during the Imamate. They helped in defeating the colonial
Turkish forces and mobilized men and support every time they felt threatened by their
neighbors and this chapter will unfold few of those historical episodes.
Dresch in his account on Yemen simplified the social structure in Upper Yemen during
the early 1900s by dividing the society broadly to ―peasants as opposed to tribesmen‖46,
as their presence translated to both social and political influence. During that period the
Imamate was in the hands of Yahya Bin Hamid Al-Din; ―Yahya, (himself of course a
sayyid) gave many sayyid families a stake in what emerged as a state, and then a
dynasty… and claimed a place of its own on the world map‖.47 Sayyids, descendent of the
Prophet, held a status that gave them religious legitimacy and a higher social ranking than
the peasants and the tribesmen. However, this status was abused at times and soon
differences started to appear between the tribe and the Imamate. Abu Ghanim, however;
explains that the essence of the tribal system contradicts to some extent that of the
Imamate rule as the first is independent in nature while the latter adopts the traditions of
dynastic rule.48 This was not the case with all tribes in the north as some of them were in
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line with the Imam and offered support in exchange for more power or merely survival.
Dresch better supported this claim by stating that ―shaykhs of northern tribes, who in
1918 has entered Sana‘a beside Yahya, were less important, [but] retained their lands and
a certain precedence, and many received a percentage of tax they gathered‖ and that‘s
how the independence of some of these tribes was ―circumscribed‖ by the ruler.49
On the other hand, resistance was manifested by other tribes even before the reign of
Imam Yahya that saw some clashes erupt, and rebellion attempts were on the rise few of
which took place in tribal-dominant regions like Hashid, Arhab and Sana‘a.50 Taking this
into consideration, successive Imams would first try to settle differences with the tribes
and guarantee their loyalty to ensure power consolidation. Thus, Imam Yahya employed
certain techniques that made him win the tribes to his side, while on other occasions
helped him tame their threat. After raising the banner of resisting the Turkish presence in
Sana‘a, he appeared as a hero and consequently won the support of many tribes in the
north that supplied his campaign with men and resources.51 Internally, however; the
reality as described by Dresch; ―the Imam was a ruler straightforwardly. Hostages, fines
and punitive action produced public order. Rivalries [between tribal shaykhs] were not
discouraged, and the Imam in person intervened as he saw fit‖.52 Imam Yahya‘s strong
grip on power in Northern Yemen and his appointment of his sons as governors in other
provinces created major discontent even among supporters leading to a coup attempt in
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1948. The instigators of this coup that led to the killing of Imam Yahya, but failed in
toppling his son Ahmed based in Taiz, included tribal shaykhs of Dhu Muhammad and
Dhu Husayn, who were later executed by Imam Ahmed.53 This brief display of the
Imamate rule shows the extent of which the tribal structure was the tipping point in the
survival of some Imams and the failure of others. It also stretches the discussion towards
investigating the tribal structure, and whether it was a factor in the rise and fall of the
infant state in Northern Yemen.
Socio-political Organization and Leadership of the Tribe
The Interplay between the tribe and the Imamate state in Northern Yemen was not limited
to the incidents mentioned previously, but provided the basis to investigating the integral
role of the tribe in relation to the state and the society. This section will aim at studying
the tribe as a unit and describing the organizational and leadership structure mainly in
Northern Yemen. ―The tribe has been and will always be the main unit of the Yemeni
society not only because it can range in size between an extended family to forming a
tribal confederation, but also because it has always been a unit of war, economic
production and societal organization" as put by Abu Ghanim.54
This general statement can only be confirmed if the origins and the hierarchal structure of
the tribes in Northern Yemen are thoroughly explained. Swagman in his anthropological
work in the Yemeni highlands stated that the leadership of the tribe is represented by the
shaykh, who is an ―elected representative of the tribal group and hold his office through
consent of the tribesmen‖, highlighting that leadership of the tribe is processed through
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some form of democracy and acceptance.55 In addition, Shelagh Weir stated that ―a
shaykh consolidates his domestic position by gaining the trust and the confidence of the
seniors, who act as counselors… and in order to retain [their] loyalty he needs to call
tribal councils and consult them regularly‖.56 Moreover, Abu Ghanim reaffirms that
"tribal leaders whom we would call Al-Mashayekh are considered the highest ranking
within the tribe and they hold a great political power, through heading the tribal council
that runs the political and societal affairs of the tribe‖. Moreover, Al-Mashayekh, plural of
shaykh, were known for their political influence not only within their tribe but extend that
influence to the state.57 This social status is not only recognized among tribesmen, but
also other neighboring tribes, non-tribal communities in tribal regions and local
administrators. They use ―their economic and political influence mostly through
persuasion and squeezing those whom they wish to influence, as described by one
shaykh‖.58 Most importantly, and as the shaykh seeks acknowledgment from other tribal
leaders, he must maintain good relations with tribal allies, through inviting them to key
tribal events as witnesses or guests.59 This inauguration-like process is supposed to send
the message to state representatives and other tribes that there is a new shaykh in charge
of the political role of the respective tribe.
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The social role, however, is not any different as Al-Mashayekh are positioned at the top
of the social ladder as accounted by Abu Ghanim: ―Historians argued that pre-Islamic
society in Yemeni was divided mainly into three social classes: 1) The upper class that
consisted of the king, religious leaders, tribal leaders and administrative workers
protecting trade routes. 2) The middle class made up of the peasants who are mostly
tribesmen and those account for largest majority of the population. 3) The lower class
included the traders, artisans and slaves. This social structure has almost remained the
same up until the collapse of the Imamate rule in 1962".60 The social structure that
remained unchanged for a long time suggests that there were social norms and values that
were developed by the society, mostly tribal, and managed to sustain the social, political
and economic affairs of the inhabitants. Weir also added that ―even in punitive mode, the
state acknowledged, depended upon, and reinforced tribal structures and practices‖.61
These norms, known as tribal customs, survived the successive dynasties, caliphates and
states ruling in Yemen, and had been the product of the tribe that outlived the state in
Yemen, thus suggesting that these norms adapt to the political landscape surrounding the
tribe.
The survival instinct of the tribal customs is owed to several factors and Abu Ghanim,
rephrasing Bafaqeeh‘s historical work on Yemen, stressed on the point that the difficult
topography helped in creating scattered settlements called Sho'ob which were controlled
by local leaders; and these made the formation of a central administration a complicated
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task ever since the rule of Kingdom of Sheba centuries ago.62 Hamdan, known as the
original tribe of all major tribes in Yemen, better illustrates the role played by the tribe in
deciding the political fate of the Yemen throughout different historical episodes. The
tribal council, led by Al-Mashayekh, was the body through which the tribes will exert its
political influence on the successive dynasties, and had always been an independent
structure in the process of decision-making of the empires that ruled Yemen. The
Emperor/king did not have the absolute power and had to get the support of the tribal
leaders in matter of war or peace and in other economic issues that concerned the state.
Besides their effective role in the tribal council, Al-Mashayekh also had the complete
authority of the local affairs.63 This complex formula inherited by ancient Yemeni states
and kingdoms had put any form of central administration in a position where they would
be dependent on tribal leaders in matters of war or territorial expansion, and thus would
have to cater to the interests of tribal leaders. This has ultimately led to weakening the
central administration represented by the king and encouraged tribal leaders to create
their independent lordships as seen in the final period of the kingdom of Sheba.64
Knowing that Al-Mashayekh had this political influence proves that the tribe was rooted
in Yemeni political and social life. It survived through the ages and evolved with
different successive regimes types and below is a brief account on the stability of the
tribal structure.
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The consecutive states in pre-Islamic Yemen, like Sheba, Maeen, Hemyar, were
composed of independent tribal confederations, like Hashid and Bakil, each of which
would control a specific territory but is also composed of smaller tribal entities that are
bound by shared interest.65 Similarly, Aston quoted Wilson‘s claim on tribal stability,
which held that ―substantial traces of the pre-Islamic (tribal) order continued to exist well
into the Islamic period. Over the past ten centuries there is little or no evidence of any
major tribal movements in this part of Yemen‖.66 Both of these accounts stress on the
idea of the survival of the tribes and the tribal order in the face of the successive states,
and reaffirm the notion of tribal dominance as independent institutions. It also suggests
that post- Islamic period of Yemen did not witness much change as the political and
societal structure remained intact, and isolated as a geographical unit. Moreover, ―when
sectarian split started infecting the Islamic Umma with internal conflicts, Yemeni tribes
focused on maintaining the unity and were the first to go against change of the Islamic
caliphate system from abandoning the Shura to adopting the monarchical structure as
seen during the Umayyad‟s and the Abbasid‟s rule‖.67 This, in fact, has further
marginalized Yemeni tribes from the political and historical context, as they instinctually
refuse being controlled by authoritarian rulers and believe in the freedom of choice that
they have in the tribal order. The constant state of conflict in Yemen in general can be
better explained by the rebellious nature of these tribes that would usually mobilize
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against any authority trying to impose itself forcefully. The purpose of this research is not
to go into details of outlining the tribal structure in Yemen during the several Caliphates,
but to establish the notion the tribe as basis to understand it‘s socio-political interaction
with different regime types in Yemen.
After briefly tackling the tribes‘ interaction with pre Islamic and Islamic empires and
states in Yemen, and understanding the effective role of tribal leaders; some emphasize
should be paid to the tribesman -Qabili- in relation to the tribe. This will set the path for
understanding the tribesmen lifestyle and reflect on the societal interaction of this social
group with the state. Dresch explained that the ―world outside the towns was complex as
that within them. Tribesmen, the vast majority of many regions‘ population, bore arms.
Most were farmers, few are nomads, and nearly all were extremely poor‖.68 Keeping in
mind that the majority of the population is composed of tribal peasants indicates that
most of these tribesmen collaborated to sustain their living. In addition, the complexity is
spotted in the fact that they bear arms and take matters of security to their own hands.
Swagman, however; pointed out that the peasantry system in Yemen is unique in a way
as it is ―mediated by strong tribal social organization… [which] provides for the
formulation of social groups which are larger, more structured and capable of more
cooperation‖.69 The institution of the tribe thus, implements a system within the tribe that
regulates the social life of tribesmen known as the tribal code - Urf- which has been
passed by ancestors.
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Weir elaborated on the latter concept by stating that ―Urf embraces a wide range of
activities and situations, some of which are: rules and procedures, penalties and modes of
enforcement, the conduct of political relations, constitutional events such as accession to
shakhly office and political defection, and the rights and responsibilities of individuals
and groups‖.70 Regulating the scattered complex tribal peasant societies of northern
Yemen was eased by implementing this tribal code through the office of Al-Mashayesh,
each in his own tribe. Without going into the different sections of this regulation system,
it is important to know that the Qabili are bound by the tribal code and would submit to
its outcomes, regardless of the administration that represents the formal institution of the
state. This feeds to the previously mentioned argument of the tribe being a societal
organization self-reliant and independent from the state.
Another unique fact about the tribes in Yemen is that the Qabili or tribal status is not
restricted to linage but it can be earned and conversely its can be taken away. Swagman
explained: ―membership in tribes hinges on the observance of tribal ethics, with their
emphasis on honor, bravery and protection‖.71 He added: ―failure to adhere to these
standards by fleeing blood feud, seeking protection of another tribe and taking refuge in
the marketplace can cause one to lose social recognition of his status and be absorbed
into lower ranked non-tribal people‖.72 As this account listed some of the major values of
the Qabili, it also exemplified the possible social mobility, whether upwards or
downwards, granted by the tribal code that supersede the social class, family or origin.
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The previous chapter has delved into the different perspectives on the notion of the tribe
in Yemen. This section, however, highlighted the tribal status in the social context in the
northern highlands specifically and in the period that preceded the formation of the first
republic in the Northern Yemen, and established their effective social and political role
The forthcoming section will however, study the tribe within the context of the new
political dynamics following 1962, and provide another angle of the interaction with the
major regional powers and newly established state.
The Tribe Post 1962
The period between the 1960 and 1970 witnessed a wave of political unrest that swamped
both northern and southern Yemen and shook all the existing socio-political structures.
Few of those institutions eroded, some rose from the ruins to compete for power, and
others reemerged as key players in shaping the modern states. One of these major
institutions was that of the tribe, and this section will focus on the role tribe in the
revolution of 1962 that ended the Imamate rule in the north. This section will move on to
discussing the influence of the tribes, and introduce tribalism as an informal structure that
played a role on the sequence of events during the civil war that culminated into a proxy
war between the two regional powers, Egypt and Saudi Arabia.
The 1962 revolution led to toppling the Imamate rule and ignited the first spark of change
in Northern Yemen which was regarded as the building block for the modern state
declared by President Abdullah Al-Sallal. However, prior the revolution resistance was
already mounting towards rejecting the Imamate rule supported by tribes of the north. In
addition, several coup attempts initiated by the Egyptian-backed free officers utilized this
internal dissatisfaction as a motive to carry on further assassination or coup attempts
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against the Imamate. Dresch, explained that ―in early 1958, certain network of discontent
in Tai‟zz were coordinated by wealthy merchants [while] among the shaykhs one finds
Husayn al-Ahmar, Qasim Abu Ras, Muti al-Dammaj‖ yet the discontent of these
prominent tribal shaykhs translated to mobilization in deciding the fate of the state
through pushing for change from within.73 During this period Al-Badr, Imam Ahmad‘s
son, replaced his father in running the affairs of the state given the latter‘s deteriorating
health. The young successor hoped to adopt a shy liberal approach to win prominent local
leaders and contain the growing resistance nurtured by Egypt, but Imam Ahmed‘s
restoration of power late in 1959 ended Al-Badr‘s efforts. He forcefully stated in his
return speech broadcasted by Sana‘a Radio ―there will be some whose heads will be cut
off…‖ few months later, news spread that some tribal shaykhs from Hashed and Khawlan
were executed while many others had fled.74 This punishment produced resentment
among some tribes and their allies who, according to the tribal law, must rally in defense
of the affected tribe(s). The incident troubled the Imamate rule and made an enemy out
of Hashed, one of the largest tribal confederations in the north. Abu Ghanim elaborated
on the substantial manpower of Hashed by stating that this tribal confederation consists
of a group of tribes, each of which holds a population that ranges between 10,000-50,000
tribesmen, which can be mobilized to respond to any offence on a tribe within the
confederation as per the tribal customs.75 This account illustrated the weight the tribes
have in terms of military power and reaffirms that it had always been a political player
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and a unit of war in shaping the features of the state of Yemen. Furthermore, it posed the
question of how the tribe adapted to the changes that saw the end of a dynastic rule and
the rise of the new republic in the north.
The 26th of September 1962 revolution led by junior army officers and long-awaited by
the peasants and supported by the tribes, was a turning point in the history of Yemen. It
saw the declaration of the Yemen Arab Republic (YAR) and proclaimed Abdullah AlSallal, an army officer backed up by Nasser‘s Egypt, as the first president of the newborn
state. On the 13th of April president Al-Sallal oversaw the announcement of an interim
constitution which established the basic state institutions that would serve to achieve the
revolution goals.76 It is important to mention that the shift from dynastic rule to republic
rule was a rough transition, and paving the road towards a functioning state required the
engagement of all societal structures, one of which is the tribe. Therefore, the very first
presidential executive order by Al-Sallal aimed at regulating the local affairs by
announcing the formation of tribal councils which can channel tribal concerns and
support from the tribes through the provinces and all the way to the capital.77 The decree
announced the formation of three bodies to represent the tribes. First, local tribal councils
composed of the tribal shaykhs of each respective tribe. Secondly, these local tribal
councils elected shaykhs who will represent their body in a provincial tribal council. The
latter will finally be represented by elected shaykhs in a supreme tribal council based in
the capital Sana‘a.78 Al-Sallal attempted to engage the tribes in the process of state76. Yemen Arab Republic, Yemen Arab Republic Annual Book 1963 (Sana'a: Shu'bat al-I'lam wa alIrshad, Presidential Council, 1963), 17.
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building from the beginning, and this reflected their societal, as well as the military
power that can be employed to the benefit of the state. But if these efforts were
mishandled then this tribal power can hamper the process of state-building. And the
remainder of this section will delve into this interaction between the new state and the
tribes.
Al-Sallal, though ―unconnected with the details of local demands or with locally known
names‖ as claimed by Dresch,79 appeared to leave the tribal system as it is, while the
purpose of the first presidential decree was to reassure tribal shaykhs that their position
will be maintained within the system of the new republic. The situation on the ground
was different, as some of the tribes were wary about Al-Sallal‘s project of a state that was
heavily sponsored by Egypt. This has resulted in clashes that blocked the rather young
Yemeni army from advancing into tribal areas like Hajjah, Al-Jawf or Khawlan.80 The
major Egyptian presence was not welcomed by some tribes and these clashes were seen
by the Saudi neighbor as a window of opportunity to halt Egypt‘s republican project that
can spillover and threaten the Kingdom‘s existence. Amid this growing tension between
two regional powers, the tribes were not only involved as an entity to protect its own
members or interests, but rather some tribes employed their military capacity in the form
of troops or navigation services in return for cash or weaponry incentives from the
conflicting sides.81 This internal bipolarity developed into ―a battle by proxy between
Riyadh and Cairo…and enormous expenditure of wealth by both sides [was] passed

79. Dresch, History of Modern Yemen, 89.
80. Ibid., 90.
81. Ab Gh nim, -

wa-al-dawlah, 184.

36

mainly through the hands of tribal leaders, who rallied the troops‖.82 Consequently, two
internal warring parties, branded as royalists and republicans, were both fighting on
behalf of the pro-imamate Saudi Arabia on one side and pro-republican Egypt on the
other side. The constellation of tribes involved in each side of this civil war was
confusing as some tribes switched sides for a number of reasons. Some tribes held tribal
grievances towards the execution and detention of their leaders, while some others simply
disapproved of the foreign agendas of the state. Dresch provided a better illustration of
this tribal mosaic in his account on the republican forces advancing north;
“… a series of Egyptian offensives pushed north and in a hook through Marib to
Harib to cut off the royalist supply-lines, then into the Tihamah and the western
mountains also. As these spearheads moved on, there closed up behind them an
indigenous world of alliances, disputes and shifting truces”.83
Another point of view by Swagman suggested that tribal alliances during the civil war
correlated with the religious sectarianism, claiming that the royalists were mostly Zaydi
and the republicans were Shafi‟i.84 This correlation, however, cannot be generalized as
some Zaydi tribal shaykhs fought on the side of the republicans, as Dresch explained that
the split was interpreted by Yemeni authors as ―a split between moderate and extreme
republicans‖.85 A third perspective by Umar Ghalib, a Yemeni researcher argued that the
tribal leaders distanced themselves from the leadership of the republican camp in Sana‘a
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and took matters of war to their own hands, as discontent towards the Egyptian policies
grew deeper.86 Tracing the network of the tribal alliances during the civil war in the
1960s appeared to be a difficult task, and this reaffirmed the idea of tribal independence
and the fact that they could not be manipulated or strong-armed. However, it confirmed
that the tribal role as a unit of war in the civil war, and a decisive force that initiated talks
between the warring parties. The ambiguity during the 1960s rests on whether the tribe
should be regarded as structure that challenged the formation of the modern state, or a
societal structure that helped in its creation; and no simple answer can be obtained. An
alternative approach should not look at the tribe per se, but rather at tribalism as an
informal institution that has governed this chaotic constellation of alliances during the
civil war in the 1960s and the forthcoming sections will provide answers to these
complexities through understanding tribalism in context.
Tribalism, previously defined by Legum as ―the manifestation of over-riding group
loyalties by members of a culturally affiliated society to locally based interests which
involve traditions, land, and opportunities for survival and growth‖,87 can offer an
explanation to the actions of the tribes and tribal shaykhs during the years following the
revolution of 1962. Those tribal shaykhs fought the Imamate rule and were considered
republicans, but also generally disliked the deep Egyptian intervention and were the first
to oppose president Al-Sallal, as the latter ―appeared to some as Egypt‘s puppet‖.88 This
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resulted in major splits within the republican camp especially after the arrest and
execution of republican shaykhs, or as shocking as Khawlan tribe being mostly royalist
even though ―Khawlan in 1960 never had quite submitted to Imam Ahmad‖.89
Unexpectedly, tribes do not fight for a specific political ideology, nor do they accept
being manipulated; but the tribes engage in political and war activities, if there exist
―locally based interests‖ and ―opportunities for survival and growth‖.90 As the civil war
provided the tribes with an opening to reemerge as an effective political entity, tribalism
was the framework around which tribal alliances were formed following the revolution of
1962. Some tribal leaders who saw an opportunity in the 1962 revolution were frustrated
afterwards by the overwhelming Egyptian presence and the ―survival‖ instinct translated
to splits within the republican camp as mentioned above. On the other hand, some tribal
shaykhs saw an ―opportunity for growth‖,91 for example; ―in the countryside, great names
were made in the fighting, and such republican shaykhs as Mujahed Abu Shawarib of
Kharif in Hashid became as widely known‖.92 Hence, both instances maintain the
argument that tribalism, though vague as a concept, qualifies as the structure that
governed the set of alliances during the civil war. Tribalism as a structure will be
revisited throughout the course of this study, providing the reader a better reconceptualize of the state-tribal relation in Yemen.
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After establishing tribalism as an effective structure throughout the civil war period that
stretched from 1963-1970, it is important to note that other instances of the tribal
engagement in the modern state exhibit tribalism as a framework. Most prominent of
which are; the announcement of the tribal councils as a formal body of representation, the
appointment of the paramount shaykh of Hashid Abdullah Al-Ahmar as minister of
interior,93 and the tribal mediation with the royalists to end the civil war exemplified by
the Taif conference in Saudi Arabia 1965.94 These instances and many others display how
the role of the tribe was effective in shaping the dynamics of the modern Yemeni state in
the north, and prove tribalism to be the medium through which the interaction with the
state has taken place.
Tribal Dominance of the State
Victoria Clark, a freelance journalist and writer, in her book Yemen: Dancing on the
Heads of Snakes, displayed how Egyptian intervention in Yemen came to an end. She
stated how some ―republican and royalist tribes made a powerful coalitions against the
foreign invaders‖, and how ―many of them are inconsistent in their affiliation, pragmatic
and flexible, happy to receive guns and supplies from anywhere‖.95 It is important to note
that the tribal coalition opposing Egyptian policies was essential in uniting the republican
camp especially after the Khartoum Resolution of 1967 that ended the proxy war between
Egypt and Saudi Arabia.96 The resolution, as described by Ghalib, resulted in an
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agreement to withdraw both; Saudi aid for the royalists and Egyptian troops in Yemen,
which consequently announced the end of Al-Sallal‘s term as president of YAR and the
win of the conservative republicans.97 However, Dresch suggested that pro-Sallal crowds
caused tension, and rivalries did not settle amongst the republican camp as ―those who
ejected Al-Sallal had worried primarily about a counter-coup not from trade-unionists,
merchants … but from a Shafi shaykh of al-Bayda‖.98 Evidently, tribal shaykhs
influenced this period of consolidation of the republic, and competition amongst them
reemerged as soon as the defeated royalists were integrated in the national reconciliation
that took place in 1970. The tribal leaders who came out as winners after the civil war,
emerged as dominant governmental figures like; ―Shaykh Abdullah Al-Ahmar of Hashid
who chaired the Consultative Council established in 1971‖, and Sinan Abu Luhum of
Bakil “governor by self-appointment of Hudaydah province‖.99
The transition period following President Al-Sallal was not any peaceful as turmoil was
again on the buildup not only internally but also with the neighboring PDYR, People‘s
Democratic Republic of Yemen, in the south. During the rule of Qadi Abd Al-Rahman
Al-Iryani, who headed the presidential council, tribal shaykhs played a major role in
fueling these skirmishes between YAR and southern PDYR , as many shaykhs and exiled
southern activists were at the receiving end of ―Saudi stipends‖ that aimed to challenge
the socialist regime in the south.100 Tribal shaykhs from their position as conservative
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republicans saw an opportunity for growth and sensed a threat from the left republican
wing in this transition period, even if these translated to siding with Saudi Arabia that
eminently fought the rising left in YAR. Al-Irayani was incapable of controlling the
wave of chaos, administrative corruption and multiple assassinations amongst notable
tribal shaykhes, and was pressured by Shaykh Al-Ahmar to resign.101 This reiterates the
notion of tribalism as an informal structure that regulates tribal interaction with formal
structures, in this case KSA and Al-Irayni as head of the state. Chaos in YAR was the
dominant feature and the state was struggling; as Lisa Wadeen, an expert in the Yemeni
affairs, perfectly sums up the 1970s period as follows:
―The YAR was embroiled in two wars with South Yemen in 1972 and 1979 and
endured two dramatic presidential assassinations that were filled with plot twists. The
first involved the populist military officer, President Ibrahim Al-Hamdi, whose body was
discovered along with the corpses of his brother and two other French women in 1977.
His successor Ahmad Al-Ghashmi, died six months later when and envoy from Aden
exploded a briefcase in his office.‖102
Presidency of YAR was an institution that was heavily affected by the interests of
the tribes which saw in the formation of a state an opportunity to reemerge as a societal
and political force, but also a threat to their survival. Therefore the tribalism guided their
interactions with the formal institutions of the state led by the president.
A tribesman Head of State
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The President of YAR following Qadi Al-Iryani was Lieutenant Ibrahim Al-Hamdi, who
led the correction movement against Al-Iryani after cooperating with the prominent tribal
shaykhs and military commanders, in what was referred by some Yemeni historians as a
soft coup.103 Al-Hamdi, who served in office from 1974-1977, was as a charismatic
leader who vowed for administrative development, and was the first Yemeni leader to
―master mass politics‖ and brought ―ebullience‖ to Yemen as described by Dresch, which
made him Yemen‘s Nasser in terms of popularity.104 Many stories, though, loomed
around the reasons and powers behind his assassination. Some accounts maintain that
Riyadh was discontent with his unification agenda with the south, and his aid talks with
the Soviet Union.105 While another account suggests that Al-Hamdi‘s decision to dissolve
the Consultative Council lead by Shaykh Al-Ahmar of Hashid, and the ruling out of Abu
Luhum of Bakil from military positions were perceived as a challenge by the most
prominent tribal confederations in Yemen.106 These may qualify as factors that led to AlHamdi‘s assassination, but Ghalib claims that the arguments, which stirred up between
Al-Hamdi‘s and his military commanders, Al-Ghashmi exclusively, are widely suspected
to be the reasons behind the assassination.107
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Al- Ghashmi announced himself as president of the YAR, but did not survive the political
fiasco that dominated the 1970s and was assassinated after six months from taking office
in a plot that was believably implicating his counterparts in the PDYR. Clark described in
novelty that the newly established state of YAR witnessed different personnel in
leadership and all failed miserably; ―Al-Iryani‘s qadi-run republic had failed and so had
Al-Hamdi‘s military-run republic‖, but mentioned that ―Al-Ghashmi‘s tribal-military
republic‖, though short, has ―proved to be the winning formula‖ decades later.108 Clark‘s
statement was complemented by shaykh Al-Ahmar‘s narrative that pinpointed how AlHamdi entrusted Al-Ghashmi with the commanding of the military, because the latter
also enjoyed tribal affiliation in Hamadan.109 The tribal-military republic was tested again
during the rise of Colonel Ali Abdullah Saleh of Sanhan, a sub-tribe of Hashid, who
became president of YAR, afterward the Republic of Yemen [RoY]. The intention here is
not to suggest nor claim that the tribal-military republic was the best mode of ruling of
modern Yemen, but to portray the role of the tribe and tribalism as mechanism to run the
state and govern the relations between the political players in different regime contexts.
The interaction between the informal [tribalism] and formal [state] structures in Yemen,
will unveil the nature of political activity and the period during which Saleh ruled will be
disclosed in hopes to know if the tribe is a friend or a foe.
The upcoming chapters will analyze these formal-informal interactions using the
typography of informal institutions proposed in the previous chapter. The exploration of
various converging and diverging interactions will form the guiding steps towards
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answering the main question of whether tribalism governed the relationship between the
state and the society during the Saleh era.
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Chapter 3
“Two players, one goal”

46

Unlocking the State-Tribal Relations during Saleh
The previous chapter provided a detailed account on the interaction of the tribe with the
formal institutions, embodied by the Imamate or the modern state of YAR between the
1960s and the 1970s. Each of these historical episodes witnessed tribal political activity
that shaped the political culture in Yemen. The analysis withdrawn from these
interactions revealed the decisive role of the tribe during periods of upheaval, but also
displayed inconsistency in this interaction. In some instances the tribe acted as the
peacekeeper, while on other instances it was as the war wager. The inconsistency of tribal
activity and the change in the mode of interaction with the formal institution was driven
by several factors, and these accounts reaffirm the claim that tribalism is the dominant
medium through which these interactions occur.
Tribalism, outlined in the preceding chapter, is translated to a set of uncharted rules
within a tribal community driven by an opportunity for growth or survival.110 The
objective of this chapter is to further explore the interaction between the state and the
tribe in Yemen during the rule of President Ali Abdullah Saleh, and test how tribalism
qualifies as the informal structure that governs the relationship between the state and the
tribe.
As vague as the definition of tribalism can be, the interaction between the state and the
tribe cannot be exclusively determined as good- or- bad, but it is bound by many factors,
one of which is the effectiveness of the formal institution. ―By effectiveness we mean the
extent to which rule and procedures that exist on paper are enforced or complied with in
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practice‖.111 Measuring effectiveness would require a wider ethnographic research that
target case(s) throughout time. However, it is necessary to clarify that this research aims
at investigating the relationship between the state and the tribe in Yemen, and display the
nature of these interactions within the framework of tribalism as an informal institution.
Helmke and Levitsky‘s typology of interaction between the formal-informal institutions
will be employed throughout this study. The typology of informal institutions proposed
by Helmke and Levitsky produces an outcome that is either convergent or divergent; in
other words, the formal-informal interaction either works harmoniously in achieving a
goal or; conversely, adopt different methods in reaching two different results.112

Figure 1 in Helmke and Levitsky‘s Informal Institutions and Comparative Politics:
Research Agenda displays the four types of informal institutions.113 This research will
tackle the relationship between the state and the tribe during the rule of President Ali
Abudllah Saleh through exploring the universe of interaction between the formal [state]
and informal [tribal]. Therefore, in applying the abovementioned typology this research
will evaluate and analyze formal-informal interaction in various sectors like; executive111. Helmke and Levitsky, “Introduction,” 13.
112. Ibid., 14.
113. Ibid.,
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legislative relations, electoral politics, judicial and military politics. This analysis will
examine how tribalism‘s informal rules and structures leads to convergent outcomes,
divergent outcomes, or is peculiarly a universal informal institution in its interaction with
the state during the rule of President Saleh.
Tribalism in Yemen: Between Convergence and Divergence
“There are two prevalent clichés about Yemen‟s tribal system and political
development: one is that tribalism facilitates the persistence of authoritarianism; and the
other that is already a well-established, culturally specific form of democracy”.114
Sarah Philips in her account on Yemen‟s Democracy Experiment portrayed the rigid
categorization of tribalism by the literature as either; an entirely ―dysfunctional‖ structure
to democracy in Yemen, or as a locally perfect ―functional‖ structure that holds the spirit
of democracy.115 But between these two streams the typology by Helmke and Levitsky
provides new avenues of interaction whereby; tribal informal rules can, for example;
substitute formal rules and help prevent local skirmishes from turning to conflicts. On the
other hand, this informal rule of tribesmen bearing arms is mainly accommodated in the
outskirts of cities as long as they provide security in their respective regions. This formalinformal trade-off is not consistent and is often sensitive to the political and societal
context as well as actors on both sides of this interaction. Najwa Arda, similarly,
highlighted the misconceptions on tribalism as a hurdle to development in Yemen and
listed in her ethnographic work cases that demonstrate tribal customs as complementing
114. Sarah Philips, “Tribalism in a weak state,” in Yemen’s Democr cy Experiment in Region
Perspective: Patronage and Pluralized Authoritarianism (Palgrave Macmillan, 2008) 89.
115. Helmke and Levitsky, “Introduction,” 16-17.
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informal institutions to local development.116 Conversely, a study conducted by Yemen
Polling Center (YPC) surveying the public opinion on ―the state of security in Yemen‖
displayed that ―63.5% of Yemenis consider tribal conflicts as very serious threat to the
security of the country‖.117 And as much as Arda denounced the use of violence by the
tribes in ―blood feuds‖ which is a clear competition with the state on the use of violence,
she reiterated that ―throughout, tribes and states have been dependent both economically
and politically‖.118 Thus, these accounts suggest that state-tribal relations are governed by
a set of informal institutions that are not necessarily in line with the formal rules but can
serve a greater good to the local community, or the desired political agenda of the state.
YPC presented another study on citizens‟ local council members experience in Yemen;
and when asked the question: ―Does Yemen benefits from the local councils?‖119 70% of
the sample responded with a ―Yes‖. However, almost 51% of this sample responded with
a ―No‖, when asked if ―local councils provide citizens‘ basic needs‖. However,
remarkably, around 32 % of the sample selected the ―tribal shaykh‖ as the most popular
of the ―personalities who are able to serve in their areas‖.120 This reflects two points; the
public lack of confidence on the local councils as formal institutions, but also suggests
the figure of tribal shaykh as credible local representative who can deliver services. This
116. Najwa Arda, “Tribal Mediation in Yemen and its Implications to Development,” Working
Papers on Social Anthropology, no. 19, (2011): 10, Austrian Academy of Sciences.
117. Yemen Polling Center (YPC), “The State of Security in Yemen: Great Challenges and Inherent
Weaknesses,” YPC Data Powerpoint Presentation (March 2012): 7, https://bit.ly/2K2w7ws
118. Arda, “Tribal Mediation,” 10.
119. YPC, “Local Council Members Experience in Yemen,” YPC Data on Civic Activisim (April
2007): 31, http://www.yemenpolling.org/local-council-members-experience/
120. Ibid., 33.
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illustrates a degree of convergence in terms of the desired outcome both by the tribe and
the state.
However, what should be pinpointed is that the if convergence and divergence in
relations between these separate structures is governed by the informal institution of
tribalism, as claimed earlier, then the question to be answered is how does that process
take place? Therefore, following the typology provided by Helmke and Levitsky,
informal structures and rules constituted within tribalism will be investigated in relation
to the formal institutions and actors of the state.
In reference to figure 1,121 complementary and substitutive tribalism will be analyzed
respectively through the examination of specific formal structures in relation to the tribe.
These interactions by default will reflect convergence ―employed by actors who seek
outcomes compatible with formal rules and procedures.‖122 Party politics and rural
development will serve as the two main formal structures to be tested in relation to the
tribe when examining complementary tribalism; however substitutive tribalism will be
tested through the two formal structures of security and conflict resolution. These do not
indicate the exclusivity of these interactions as convergent, but provide incidents that
match the framework of the study. The line drawn to differentiate between convergence
and divergence will be vague, but the main purpose of this study is to unveil this
complexity and dig deeper to explore the state (formal) –tribal (informal) universe during
the rule of Saleh.

121. Helmke and Levitsky, “Introduction,”14.
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Tribalism as a Complementary Institution
Complementary informal institutions suggest that the there are existing formal
institutions that are ―functioning and complied with‖ by actors. Thus, informal
institutions would only exist to ―fill in the gaps‖ of formal institutions; while in other
instances they act as the base on which formal institutions are established.123 To evaluate
the Middle East in general, and Yemen in specific, in the context of established
complementary informal institutions, many cases would lack presence of complementary
informal institutions as formal institutions are mostly ineffective or weak. But another
understanding offered by Helmke and Levitsky of complementary informal institutions
provides that they ―serve as the underlying foundation for formal institutions,‖124 and this
understanding qualifies for the studying of formal-informal interaction in the Yemeni
context as tribal customs persisted throughout the different stages of state building.
In this regard the question that poses itself in relation to studying formal-informal
interaction would be: To what extent tribalism has served as a complementary institution
to the formal institutions of state? To answer this question, formal institutional contexts
will be examined in relation to the tribe. This formal-informal interaction can first be
examined in the executive-legislative relations displayed in party politics, which
emerged in Yemen during the rule of Ali Abdullah Saleh. Rural development will serve
as another example to investigate the convergence of outcomes in the interaction between
the tribe and the state.

123. Helmke and Levitsky, “Introduction,” 13-14.
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In pursuit of Legitimacy: Party Politics
Saleh, who linked between both a military and tribal background, was quickly
promoted by the People‘s Constituent Council (PCC) to a higher military rank and
directly elected by the interim Presidential Council as President of YAR in July 1978.125
―The period 1978-1981 was one of widespread political pessimism as well as one during
which President Saleh labored to improve his political prospects‖ as described by Robert
Burrowes.126 Saleh had to guarantee survival first to perform in his role, and therefore
had to employ a circle of family members in key military and governmental positions.
This inner circle may have guaranteed his survival in the early years, but Saleh needed to
do more to maintain his grip on power in YAR, or unified Republic of Yemen later on.
Saleh ―had to create a ruling formula that could deal with contradictory aims…one of
which was the major tribes and their complicated external ties… another was legitimacy
and public support‖ as elaborated by Sief.127 Major tribes, which were marginalized by
Al-Hamdi, demanded their share of the state back, and therefore; valued the constitution
of 1970 ―that was weighted strongly towards the interests of the leading tribalists‖.128 On
the other hand, as Saleh sought legitimacy, and in order to ―broaden the regime‘s base
and strengthen its statist orientation‖, both the traditionalist tribes and the modernist left
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had to be incorporated in one body for Saleh‘s regime to flourish.129 Prior to Saleh, the
tribes enjoyed their share of power through the Consultative Council that was established
by Al-Irayni in the 1970 constitution; before it was abolished by Al-Hamdi, and
ultimately contributing to his assassination. Therefore, Saleh was occupied with restoring
this balance of power internally in order to strengthen his legitimacy and chances of
survival.
During his early years, Saleh played safe domestic politics, and did not consider ruling
out any political player out of the game amongst which were the tribes. In fact, it was
believed that the ―appointment of Shaykh Mujahid Abu Shawareb as deputy prime
minister for internal affairs‖ was seen as ―a big step towards the long-predicted
reconciliation with the major tribes‖.130 This was followed by a decree by Saleh to
enlarge the only legislative body, the People‘s Constituent Council (PCC), and
established an Advisory Council that included the Paramount Shaykh Abdullah bin
Hussain Al-Ahmar of Hashid.131 The strategy of incorporation of all adopted by Saleh
was risky, but cruised him to a safe harbor in the unstable climate surrounding domestic
politics in YAR. As legitimacy became the ultimate goal after survival of the regime;
Saleh reached out to a wider audience of notables, local leaders and tribal shaykhs
through convening of the General People‘s Congress (GPC) in 1982. This new body
described by Saleh as ―the latest stage in the expansion of democracy and political
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participation‖132 saw the light in hopes to carry on with the national dialogue leading to
the formation of the legislature besides serving as a platform for political participation.
Saleh‘s invitation of tribal Shaykhs to join the GPC indicated his need for the support of
tribesmen in the isolated rural areas inaccessible by the state. This informal form of
exchange hinges on tribalism as a structure that provided both sides the opportunity for
growth; in this case legitimacy for Saleh‘s regime in return for participation and inclusion
of the tribes in domestic politics. A further illustration of this form of informal exchange
can be expressed in fragments of a letter sent by the paramount Shaykh of Bakil Naji AlShayif to all shaykhs of Bakil in 1980:
“Despite the expenditure and the contribution that Bakil had made, and its ample
share in the course of events… we are still looking for a return on that great contribution
and that excellent share in so many fields…”133
The Saleh regime at its early stage was looking for legitimacy, and tribal shaykhs along
with technocrats appointed or elected in the GPC can guarantee the support of their
respective tribes, but in exchange for returns. Given his influence, the paramount Shaykh
of Bakil was ―[invited] to Sana‘a, where he built a huge house, and providing him no
doubt with a generous stipend, and at the same time giving responsibility for popular
army units directly to different Bakil shaykhs”.134 The GPC, however; slowly grew to
become a regime‘s social club were rewards and incentives were distributed. As the
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regime was seeking legitimacy and political actors were seeking political participation
this interaction between the informal-formal was administered by the GPC as the political
organization - not a political party yet- in charge of bringing all political factions and
trends together. It was only after the unification that the GPC was declared as a political
party that represented the ruling regime of the former YAR, as they were banned before
then; however remained ―without coherent interests, structure or discipline.‖135
The tribal structure managed not to only ―serve as the underlying foundation‖136 of
forming the GPC as a political party but also the formation of other political parties in
unified Yemen. On the other hand, tribal shaykhs saw in party politics a way to secure a
seat in the new political configuration that followed the unification. Therefore, prominent
tribal shaykhs raced towards joining or forming new political parties. Shaykh Abdullah
Al-Ahmar of Hashid led the Yemeni Congregation of Reform (Islah), shaykh Abu Lahum
of Bakil established the Republican Party, copying the US model, while shaykh Mojahed
Abu Shawareb joined the Ba‘ath party, and many others who were scattered all over the
political spectrum.137 This mix-and-match approach was experimental and reflects the
political euphoria that followed the unification, however; it also displayed how tribalism
can serve as a complementary institution regulating the formal structure of party politics
in relation to the informal structure of the tribe. Another formal institution will be
outlined in the next section and attempt to solidify the notion of tribalism as a
complementary institution during the rule of Saleh.
135. Saif, A Legislature in Transition: The Yemeni Parliament, 83.
136. Helmke and Levitsky, “Introduction,” 13-14.
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Complementary Tribalism and Rural Development
The interaction between the state and the tribe was not limited to the political sphere, but
was extended and are deeply rooted in the society. As Northern Yemen was isolated
during the imamate rule, many developmental projects; like schools, hospitals and other
public services were in demand in the rural areas and the relatively new state was weak
and incapable of carrying these projects. Therefore, ―from the 1960s, and most
dramatically after the civil war scores of small, grassroots, self-help Local Development
Associations (LDAs) sprang up spontaneously‖.138 Swagman added: ―the shaykh of the
community, in association with the important families organized their own workforce and
collected money from the residents for these public projects‖.139 The rise of the LDAs as
a model of development was embraced by tribes and tribal shaykhs in the north proving
that tribalism can extend beyond political sphere to societal and community engagement.
Moreover, in 1973 when the LDAs were incorporated to the central government under
the Confederation of Yemeni Development Associations (CYDA), tribal shaykhs showed
enthusiasm towards joining this governmental body whose members were elected and, in
fact, participated in the elections.
This demonstration of another level of interaction between the state and the tribe
illustrated by LDA model displays the complementary interaction between these two
institutions in the field of development. Projects such as schools, hospitals and roads
were a common interest both for the state and the tribes respectively; as the formal
institution of the state seeks access to these isolated rural areas, while in return the rural
138. Weir, Tribal Order of Yemen, 289.
139. Swagman, “Social Organization,” 179.
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population, mainly tribal, will have accessible healthcare, services and roads to link their
villages.
―What sets the tribe aside in Yemen is that it had filled the gaps unoccupied by the state
historically, through setting the norms and tribal rules that have regulated societal
relations in their regions, imitating the role of civil society organizations particularly in
the absence of democracy‖140
The above quote extracted from an official report published by the Ministry of Planning
and Development in 1998 illustrates the nature of this complementary interaction
between the state and the tribe that goes beyond the political. In fact, Arda reiterates in
her account on development in Yemen that ―Yemeni tribes and tribal segments are
essentially cooperative units that can mobilize easily to perform tasks deemed important
to the community.‖141 As evident in the accounts on party politics above convergence in
outcomes between the formal (state) and the informal (tribe) can be attained when
tribalism serves a complementary institution moderating this interaction. Convergence
will be outlined in the upcoming section through examining tribalism as a substitutive
institution as this research is progressing to analyze whether tribalism governed the
relationship between the state and the tribe during the rule of Saleh.
Tribalism as a Substitutive Institution
Substitutive informal institutions exist in areas where the state is absent, weak or is
unable to exercise its authority or implement its formal rules. Helmke and Levitsky
140. Al-Abdalī, thaqafat-al-dimuqratiyah, 120.
141. Arda, “Tribal Mediation,” 11.
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clarify that ―substitutive informal institutions are employed by actors who seek outcomes
compatible with formal rules and procedures.‖142 Applying this explanation to the state
(formal) – tribal (informal) configuration in Yemen during the rule of Saleh will yield
many incidents, some of which can be studied to evaluate how tribalism can serve as a
substitutive institution. The prerequisites for substitutive institutions, namely tribalism, to
thrive are present in Yemen. Saif elaborates that ―due to the state‘s weakness and its
limited capabilities, society has developed its own legal framework which mixes Islamic
law and tribal customary law.‖143 On the other hand, a recently published YPC policy
report maintains that ―tribes, tribal law and conflict regulation in many parts of the
country serve as substitutes for a weak state with a limited reach.‖144 In that regard, two
formal state institutions will be evaluated in the reminder of this section to answer the
question of how tribalism has served as a substitutive institution to the formal institutions
of state. This formal-informal interaction can first be tackled through examining local
security, and secondly through evaluating the process of tribal mediation, during the
rule of Saleh. The interactions between the state and the tribe that will be outlined will
mirror complementary institutions in how they arrive to outcomes that are desired by the
formal institutions, hence reaching convergence. The only significant difference between
complementary and substitutive informal institutions is that the latter acknowledges the
weakness of the formal institutions of the state and the following sections will dissect
such institutions in relation to the tribe in Yemen.
142. Helmke and Levitsky, “Introduction,” 16.
143. Saif, A Legislature in Transition: The Yemeni Parliament, 109.
144. Dimitris Soudias and Mareike Transfeld, “Mapping Popular Perceptions, Local Security,
Insecurity and Police Work in Yemen” YPC Policy Report, (14 July 2014): 19, https://bit.ly/2RCXK3f
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The Tribe and Local Security
“The term security seems to describe one of poor people‟s major concerns. In general,
security implies stability and continuity…”145
Yemen is one of the poorest countries that has witnessed various political challenges
affecting the livelihood of the local population most of which live in the rural areas.
YPC‘s poll on the Public Perceptions of the Security Sector and Police Work in Yemen
showed significant results in this realm of state-societal relations some of which are as
follows; 89% of the sample living in the rural areas declared that there are no police
stations in the area146, while 31% of the whole sample believe that the first actor to react
to security incidents are tribal leaders.147 These numbers reflect two things; the inability
of the state to infiltrate rural areas and the strength of the tribal shaykhs in these regions.
However this substitution of roles is mostly evident in rural area where the tribes are
dominant and the state is weak, thus setting the stage for tribalism to serve as a
substitutive institution. Few cases will be outlined to clarify this interaction in which the
final outcome is favored by both the formal (state) and the informal (tribe).
Taking the case of Sa‟da, one of the most underdeveloped governorates in Yemen, one
can review the security situation in a governorate that has witnessed six wars between the
government and the Houthis during the rule of Saleh. Based on YPC poll results, 40% of
145. World Bank Report, “Voices of the Poor: Crying out for Change” World Bank Poverty Division
(January 2000): 152, https://bit.ly/2RAJoAI
146. Yemen Polling Center (YPC), “Public Perceptions of the Security Sector and Police Work in
Yemen,” YPC Data Major Survey Findings Powerpoint Presentation (January 2013): 36,
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147. Ibid., 74.
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the sample from Sa‟da ―believes that tribal leaders should be the first to deal with
security issues…‖ and 28% actually believe that tribes are providing the security in the
rural governorate.148 Contrary to that ―Not a single respondent stated that the police
provide security‖149 supporting Shiela Carapico‘s argument that ―Yemen has autonomous
space‖ which can never be controlled by the state, but rather be ruled through the
―incorporation of local strongmen.‖150 The YPC poll projects the same notion as 66% of
the whole sample ―wants the police to seek the assistance of tribal shyakhs in resolving
security issues.‖151 Consequently, tribalism as a substitutive institution can serve the
interest of both the local communities and the state in maintaining the security in rural
areas.
Another case that can be highlighted is the state‘s war against Al-Qaeda and how the
tribal structures can be mobilized to help the state against its war on Al-Qaeda in the
Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). ―On a number of occasions, tribes in southern Yemen have
battled alongside government forces to push out al-Qaeda and other extremist Islamic
groups in order to ensure their communities‘ safety.‖152 YPC poll results also display
results of residents from governorates affected by AQAP who prefer if the security
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apparatus use the assistance of the tribe and tribal shyakhs in leading the war against
AQAP.153
On Tribal Mediation
“Specifically in Yemen there is considerable flexibility and adaptability in indigenous
tribal procedures and decisions, more so than one usually finds in state justice systems,
and decisions are restorative rather than coercive.”154
This quote by Arda in Tribal Mediation in Yemen and its Implication on development,
shed the light on another state-societal interaction that can be performed using the
informal substitutive institution of tribalism that saves the dignity of the parties in
conflict and without the use of force. Previous chapters have highlighted major role
played by the tribal shaykhs in leading negotiations or mitigating internal conflicts. At the
local level the inaccessibility of the state in rural regions and the long processes of the
justice systems maintained that communities resort to the quicker and more efficient
option provided by tribalism to seek justice. The notion of Urf–tribal customes- that was
discussed previously translates to a code of honor that is respected by all parties involved
in the conflict and is overseen usually by a third party neutral to the conflict. Moreover,
“conflicts between the state and tribes are usually also resolved through mediation, as if
the state is a tribal party within the conflict”155 and this proves that tribal mediation can
replace the formal structures of the state in conflict resolution.
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Saleh‘s regime resorted to tribal mediation to end conflicts that erupted within the state
structure or those skirmishes that challenged the state in the urban setting. But tribal
mediations cannot resolve all conflicts or negotiate settlements as it needs willingness
and commitment from all conflicting parties to honor the agreement reached.
To exemplify how tribal mediation process works one of Arda‘s cases will be displayed
below:
“a man is fined heavily for attacking someone who had wronged him. Yaḥyā accidentally
crushed a crate of tomatoes belonging to Ṣāliḥ as he was backing up his truck. He offered
to pay for the tomatoes, but Ṣāliḥ refused, then took out his knife and stabbed Yaḥyā in
the back as he walked away. Ṣāliḥ, who initially had been the victim of Yaḥyā‟s
carelessness, had to pay Yaḥyā reparations of 65,000 Y.R. ($14,444 in 1978) to cover his
medical costs and a sacrifice of two cows. Not only did he try to take the law into his own
hands when he should have registered a formal complaint, but he had stabbed a man in
the back, a highly dishonorable act.”156
Salih, the truck driver, in this case turned from a victim to a culprit mostly because he
broke the tribal code that shames any persons who attacks a man from the back, and
hence had to pay the reparations instead of being on the receiving end. The formal
judicial system might have ruled otherwise or at least a ruling with lighter reparations.
Tribalism can be substituting the formal rules and structures but sometime comes short
when the conflict is complex or involved many factions.

156. Arda, “Tribal Mediation,” 5.

63

Tribal mediation was also evident during the Sa‟ada wars that stretched from 2004-2010,
but all those attempts of de-escalation or mediation did not reap any fruit. Marieke
Brandt, a specialist on the Houthi affairs listed the main reasons that led to the failure of
all negotiations and attempts of mediation; firstly, the Houthi conflict was not a tribal
conflict at the beginning and thus applying the tribal code will be invalid, secondly,
president Saleh blocked all attempts for mediation at the national level though appointing
large team of negotiators who were not neutral and could not work together, and finally
was the lack of leadership at both sides to prevent respective sides from sabotaging any
ceasefire or attempt for mediation.157 The Sa‟ada wars mediation attempts might have
also failed due to the many geopolitical factors that are entangled with the conflicting
parties, in this case the state and a political faction. Tribalism as an informal substitutive
institution can provide the answer sometime, but not all the time as changing variables
can result in different state-societal configurations.
Conclusion
―The language of tribalism is not that of the state… and a man, who is fluent in both, as
are several great political figures, must portion his competence out according to place
and circumstances.‖158
Dresch, quoted above, summarized the notion of convergence as the interactions between
the formal (state) and informal (tribe) take place, tribalism can serve as the ―language‖
that complements or substitutes the formal structure to reach the desired goal. Tribalism
157. Marieke Brandt, “Tribes and Politics in Yemen: A History of the Houthi Conflict”, (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2017), 162-163.
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as an informal structure is a wide universe that is yet to be discovered and the objective
of this study is to explore the different arenas governing the state-tribal relations. The
following chapter will display other levels of interaction between state and the tribe,
where divergence will be the unifying theme. Saleh ―a man who is fluent in both
[languages]‖ is the main political actor to be analyzed in relation to interacting with other
state institutions, political and tribal figures. It is yet to be discovered whether Saleh
manipulated tribalism as an informal structure during his reign as a president of Yemen.
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Chapter 4
Tribalism –but not the Tribe- to Blame
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Introduction
The previous chapter has outlined the emergence of the informal institution of tribalism
interacting with the formal institutions of the state to achieve convergent outcomes.
Tribalism, whether complementary or substitutive as demonstrated in the previous
chapter, ―may be explained as a historically contingent, and ultimately path-dependent,
process‖ as labeled by Helmke and Levitsky.159 Political participation, local security and
development, and conflict mediation were illustrated as areas that use preexisting tribal
rules in molding formal state rules and structures. However outcomes arising from statetribal interactions in Yemen cannot be solely convergent. Informal institutions of
tribalism can similarly derive divergent outcomes. These informal rules can be employed
by actors in order to compete with the formal structure of the state, or to accommodate
personal gains and interests different than those sponsored by the state‘s formal
structures.
The emergence of tribalism as an informal institution is considered a historical given as
studies on Yemen have suggested, but they also have failed to capture how these informal
structures and (unwritten) rule of tribalism were recreated and reestablished by political
actors in Yemen. The modern state represented by its political parties, head of state,
military establishment and judiciary body, to name few, sustained this interaction with
the informal institution of tribalism. Yemeni citizens, not necessarily tribal members,
have also exercised tribalism in their dealings with state formal institutions. This
highlights that the interaction can go both ways‖ sometimes dictated by ―small members
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of the [political] elite‖ while in other times ―it is linked to border societal values or
cultural patterns‖.160
Figure 1. of Helmke and Levistky outlines the typology of informal institutions in which
divergent outcomes are represented by accommodating and competing informal
institutions in relation to their interaction with formal institutions.161 In order to
understand the upcoming episodes of interaction, the next section will define
accommodating and competing institutions and pinpoint their relevance within the wider
universe of state (formal) - and tribal (informal) interactions.
What Counts as Divergence
The merit of using the typology proposed by Helmke and Levitsky has unveiled a
different cosmos that can be studied to get a better understanding of complicated statesocietal relations. It is important to note that the objective of this study is to shed the light
on this interaction, and detect whether the informal institution of tribalism has governed
this universe during the rule of President Ali Abdullah Saleh. This study will explore
state-societal interaction, but cannot present or validate answers as this would require a
wider ethnographic research that stretches beyond the scope of this paper.
Helmke and Levitsky in their extensive introduction on informal institutions in Latin
America emphasized on the difficulty of labeling informal institutions and expressed the
fluidity of the typology and how, for example; ―indigenous laws may fall into all four
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categories‖.162 As this research focuses on tribalism - an indigenous law in its essence some of these informal rules and institutions can apply in any of the four typology
quadrants in relation to the formal institution that is studied. However in this chapter the
goal is to display divergence of outcomes resulting from formal-informal interactions.
According to Helmke and Levitsky, divergent outcomes occur in two general scenarios;
1) When effective formal institutions interact with accommodating informal institutions,
and 2) When ineffective informal institutions interact with competing informal
institutions.163 Accommodating informal institutions ―are created by actors who dislike
the outcomes generated by the formal rules but are unable to change or openly violate
those rules‖.164 An example of accommodating informal institution mentioned earlier
illustrated how at one point the Yemeni security apparatus applied gun control in major
cities165 but loosen the grip in rural areas where the state has limited administrative
presence. On the other hand, competing informal institutions ―structure incentives in
ways that are incompatible with the formal rules: to follow one rule, actors must violate
another‖.166 For example the tribes in Yemen resort to the competing informal rule of
carrying firearms to challenge the state institutions in applying the law in some parts of
the country.
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This categorization presented by Helmke and Levitsky is applicable in evaluating the
case of formal-informal interaction in Yemen during the rule of Saleh. Studying the
emergence or origins of accommodating and competing informal rules within the
executive and military sector will help in unveiling whether tribalism governs the
relationship between the state and the tribe in Yemen.
Accommodating Informal Rules and Saleh’s Regime
In previous chapters the definition of informal institutions were identified ―as socially
shared rules, usually unwritten, that are created, communicated and enforced outside
official sanctioned channels‖.167 Tribalism has also been established earlier as an
informal institution that has been employed by actors in Yemen to achieve their desired
interests of growth and survival. However, if these interests diverge in outcome from the
formal institutions of the state, accommodating informal institutions or rules are created
or employed by actors to ―help reconcile these actor‘s interests with the existing formal
institutional arrangements‖.168 This section will display the emergences of tribalism as an
accommodating informal institution that featured the political reality in Yemen during the
rule of President Ali Abdullah Saleh.
“As an army officer I can be sacked just like any other governmental employee can be sacked. As
a member of my tribe, however, I remain forever.” 169
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Thorough observation to the abovementioned statement by Saleh reveals the key to his
clinch to power for more than three decades. Saleh managed to maintain imaginary
regime stability and survived in power considerably longer than anticipated, after years of
upheaval and political chaos. Saleh‘s appointment as president of YAR brought the
equilibrium necessary to guaranteeing the sought for stability in YAR in the late 1970s.
The interaction between the formal institution of the military establishment led by
President Saleh and the informal institution of tribal membership was manipulated by
Saleh. As the head of state he played the informal institution of tribalism as means to an
end - remaining in power – for as long as possible. The loyalty of tribesmen and the
effect of tribal membership constitute how Saleh maintained influence in the political
sphere in Yemen even after departure from office. This marriage between the military
and the tribal identities, mentioned earlier by Clark as the tribal-military republic, proved
to be effective in strengthening Saleh‘s regime.170
The detailed account on Accommodating Informal Institutions and Chilean Democracy
by Siavelis, suggests that accommodating informal institutions are ―most likely to be
found where political actors face difficulty operating within formal institutions, or where
there is lack of congruence between political reality and formal institutional
arrangements.‖171 This description of accommodating informal institutions can be applied
to the Yemeni context in very limited examples, as there are few efficient state
institutions similar to the complementing informal institutions, but actors from within
170. Clark, Dancing on the Heads of Snakes, 111.
171. Peter Siavelis, “Accommodating Informal Institutions and Chilean Democracy,” in Informal
Institutions and Democracy, ed. Gretchen Helmke and Steven Levitsky (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins
University Press, 2006), 34.
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these institutions employed accommodating informal rules to be able to challenge the
rising influence of the tribes in the political domain in Yemen. Therefore, a top-down
accommodating informal rule was the tribalization of the military initiated by president
Saleh after coming to power following the assassination of the two former militaryranked presidents. This accommodating informal rule will be evaluated within the
framework of formal (state) – informal (tribal) interaction and provide further
understating of tribalism.
Tribalization of the Military
One stark informal rule that appeared after the inauguration of Saleh as President of YAR
was the process of tribalizing the military institution. This accommodating informal rule
that ―violate the spirit of the formal rules‖ had emerged and ―was viewed as broadly
beneficial‖ by the political actors.172 This section will trace the emergence of the process
of tribalizing the military, as an accommodating informal rule. This formal-informal
interaction will be analyzed to demonstrate the role it played maintaining the Saleh
regime for more than three decades.
Informal institutions are more likely where all actors gain equally from their creation,
where there are shared expectations about potentially negative and positive outcomes,
and where the shadow of the future makes their maintenance worthwhile for the long
term‖173. As the main political actor Ali Abdullah Saleh a, tribesman himself, was clever
to manipulate some of the tribal informal rules and practices into the modern political
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scene of Yemen. Saleh‘s survival in office was not a miracle but an example of how he
used tribalism, which constitutes by definition survival and growth, as an accommodating
informal institution. ―Because of his own tribal affiliation and the well-established
political structures and coteries he encountered when he came to power, [he] moved to
accommodate especially the major Hashid shaykhs.‖174 Saleh carried on the process of
recruiting army officers from his own Sanhan tribe, a small tribe that is part of the
Hashid tribal confederation. Through using this informal rule of tribal affiliation he
embedded personal loyalty to him as a Sanhani more than to his political figure as the
commander-in-chief of the army forces. This process of tribalization of the military
institution was an accommodating, top-down informal rule that was initiated by Saleh to
create formidable inner-circle in a state missing the monopoly on violence.175
The idea of tribalization of the military institution was not a new practice, but one that
has existed during the Imamate rule; as Fattah elaborates that ―the Imam had a third
army, the so-called Jaysh al-Barani, a tribal or desert army, which was a non-regular
military force, comprised of tribesmen from the Zaydi highlands‖176. The Imamate rule
collapsed however because interests of the tribes were no longer met by the authority of
the formal structure represented by the Imam. On the other hand, Saleh who ―has thrown
a Sanhan ring of steel around his palace‖ in Sana‘a but was abandoned in his final days
by his Sanhan tribe and other tribal allies when their interests of survival and growth
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pointed a different direction.177 Looking down the memory lane of Saleh‘s regime of the
unified RoY or earlier as a president to the YAR tribal shaykhs were mainly harbored by
Saleh in the military institution, legislative branch, and at a later stage the commercial
complex.
The military institution played an important role in shaping the history of modern Yemen,
as one analyst puts it; ―Yemen‘s military (and particularly that of North Yemen) has
evolved from kingmaker, to regime change facilitator, to a side-lined shell of an
institution.‖178 Salah, a son of the institution, recognized its importance and worked
towards building a strong army that will hold the same mindset of tribally ―remaining
forever.‖179 The emergence and persistence of this accommodating informal rule was
successfully described by Fattah; who stated that ―in post-revolutionary north Yemen, the
military at its top levels has turned into a base for tribal power, while at its lower levels, it
has turned into a wide arena for recruiting tribesmen as a part of the regime‘s politics of
survival and co-optation.‖180 Tribalization of the military established Saleh‘s resilient
regime and gave specific tribal shaykhs access the state resources. But not all shaykhs
were included in Saleh‘s inner circle. Brandt explain that certain tribal shaykhs from
other regions, specifically shaykhs of Sa‟dah region, showed support to Saleh in
protecting the northern borders but ―never gained direct access… to the upper echelon of
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the political executive and military command‖(59).181 What became to be known as
Sanhanism of the military institution was also well opposed by other tribal confederations
of Bakil and Madhhij whom in the Saba‘ Conference in 1992 gathered to voice their
objection to the ―hundred-officials-from-only-one-house-and-family‖ rule.182 This
accommodating informal rule intimidated other tribes who knew that they were excluded
from the opportunity of growth, but it solidified Saleh‘s control over the political
landscape in the first decade of his reign.
Survival and growth are the objectives of both sides of this formal-informal interaction,
and this accommodating informal structure ―helped reconcile these actor‘s interests with
the existing formal institutional arrangements‖.183 The unification of Yemen presented
another opportunity of creating a national army that should include the armed forces of
both the YAR and the PDYR, and Saleh‘s process of Sanhanism in the military
institution was denounced by his southern counterparts. In clear protest ―a list of thirtythree names in the military… from a handful of Sanhani villages‖ was published in the
Southern newspaper (Voices of the Workers)184, echoing voices for reform in the military
institution. Sponsored talks and agreements initiated attempts for reform after unification,
but the mounting distrust amongst the leadership of both sides sparked the war of
secession in May 1994 in which Saleh came out victorious. This war was test to the
resiliency of Saleh‘s regime and it demonstrated that the ―tightly sealed family-tribal
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based military commanding structure [was] one of the major factors behind the victory of
the northern army‖.185 The northern tribal-military leaders of from Hashid confederation
were gifted the bounties of this victory by Saleh in the form of properties in the
waterfronts of Aden or control over provinces in the south; for example ―Hadramawt was
controlled by Mohamed Ismail of Sanhan… and Abyan was controlled by the President‘s
son Ahmad‖.186
The lead up to unification of northern and southern Yemen ―saw a lack of congruence
between the political reality and formal institutional arrangements,‖187 and therefore the
tribalization of the military institution employed by Saleh was the deciding factor in his
regime‘s survival and resiliency after the war of secession. Saleh recognized that there is
a gap between the state and informal power of the tribe and he worked towards welding
the two entities into a ―military-tribal complex‖.188 The informal rule of tribalizing the
military was the accommodating informal rule that built this formidable complex of the
Saleh regime. The interaction outlined above affected a group of actors positively (Salehselected tribal shaykhs), and tribalism as an informal rule governed this relationship
between President Saleh and tribal shaykhs, but diverged widely from the goals of formal
institution that oppose favoritism. However the next section will highlight tribalism as an
informal institution that presents itself at odds with the formal institutions of the state but
was employed by actors to arrive to their interests. This should be the last piece of the
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puzzle that will answer the question of whether tribalism governed the relationship
between the state and tribe in Yemen during the rule of Saleh.
Tribalism as a Competing institution
Tribalism was earlier defined as "the manifestation of overriding group loyalties by
members of a culturally affiliated society to locally based interests which involve
tradition, land, and opportunities for survival and growth.‖189 In relation to interactions
with formal institutions Dresch in his accounts on Yemen has mentioned how tribalism in
Yemen was widely portrayed by different scholars as a competing informal institution; in
a way ―that tribes and the states must somehow be opposites‖190, or ―tribalism identified
with endemic treachery.‖191 Some other academics even took the path of identifying
tribalism as a hurdle to democracy; in how tribal affiliation restricted the functioning of
the formal institution of the parliament,192 or how tribal shaykhs manipulated partypolitics in Yemen.193 These illustrations, bearing in mind that Yemen is a weak state with
generally ineffective formal institutions, identified tribalism mainly as a competing
informal institution. Hence the meat and bones of the scholarship on the tribe and
tribalism in Yemen represented the divergent outcomes yield by this formal (state)informal (tribal) interaction.
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Helmke and Levitsky identify two types of competing informal institutions; ―a)
Particularistic norms such as corruption, clientelism, and patrimonialism, b) Traditional
or indigenous institutions194 both of which ―structure incentives in ways that are
incompatible with formal rules… and often said to subvert formal state institutions‖.195
The history of the modern –and weak- state of Yemen displayed many episodes of
interaction between the state and the tribe were subversion of the latter prevailed once
opportunities for survival and growth were at stake giving rise for the emergence of
tribalism as a competing institution. As established in previous sections of this research
the tribes clashed with the Imamate rule, dismissed the first officer President of YAR,
and manipulated both the republican and royalist sides during the proxy war of the late
1960s. The Saleh regime, searching for survival during its inauguration, was keen on the
inclusion of the tribes through party politics or drafting in the military institution, to name
few examples. This interaction saw the emergence of competing informal institutions
when tribal rules clashed with the regime and vice versa.
Under the umbrella of tribalism as an informal institution there exist several competing
informal rules or structures that persisted or emerged when the tribe is challenged by the
formal institution of the state. Al-Mutawakel quoted by Al-Abdali elaborated on notion
of the tribe as a separate entity which can provide the political balance and curb the
regime dictatorship with its gun power or restore law and order in the absence of the
state.196 This notion however does not capture the political reality of the tribe during the
194. Helmke and Levitsky, Informal Institutions and Democracy, 276-77.
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rule of President Saleh. In the last few decades the tribal unit witnessed major changes in
its structure that resulted in the weakening of the tribal leadership represented by the
Shaykhs. Particularistic competing informal structure, such the phenomenon of urban
shaykhs , which emerged as part of Saleh‘s regime complex weakened the tribal shaykhs,
and ultimately the tribe as a unit. On the other hand, one indigenous (tribal) competing
informal rule that violates the formal rules of the state is tribal roadblocks. These two
competing informal institutions will be evaluated to further understand the role of
tribalism within the framework formal (state) –informal (tribal) interaction.
The Phenomenon of Urban Shaykhs
Helmke and Levitsky‘s attempts of exploring the creation process of informal institutions
arrived to one suggestion that observe this creation ―through the lens of coordination.‖
They elaborated further by stating that: ―coordination often takes place in a context in
which power and resources are unevenly distributed [therefore] informal institutions are
cast as the culmination of the bargaining process in which actors seek to maximize their
benefits‖.197 The phenomenon of urban shaykhs as a particularistic competing informal
structure will be evaluated through this ‗lens‘ and the interaction between Saleh‘s regime
and the tribal shaykhs, as main actors, will be outlined to understand how interests or
benefits were maximized, thus resulting in divergent outcomes.
Perhaps shedding the light on the economic and societal structure before Saleh time in
office in the late 1970s will provide perspective to the emergence of the phenomenon of
urban shaykhs and help explain how it is considered a competing informal institution.
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Dresch in his study of estates of society in tribal life in Yemen identifies non-tribal
people, who were considered by tribesmen as weak people or mazayinah, and those were
mainly the barbers, butchers, and traders. In fact ―for a tribesman to sell his own [grain]
produce himself at market was, until perhaps the end of 1960s, reckoned as „ayb
disgrace… it has to be sold through the weak intermediaries‖.198 These estates of society
are better studied by sociologist and anthropologists, but were referenced here as they
played a great role in understanding the changing state-societal relations and tap into the
informal rules that once stood but are now perished. Lancker paraphrasing Tutwiler‘s
observation, expressed that with the emergence of a commerce economy in the 1980s and
the source of wealth it provides ―gradually changed the status of traders… as more
tribesmen seek to enter petty commerce‖199, therefore starting a move to towns amongst
those were major tribal shaykhs.200 The phenomenon of urban shaykhs however
flourished and was cemented during the Saleh era, and served as a particularistic informal
rule that enhanced regime survival, growth, and consequently weakened the tribe.
This move by the tribesmen and mainly tribal shaykhs to the towns and centers of power
like the capital Sana‘a and other major cities was seen as an opportunity of growth. On
the other hand Saleh‘s access to financial power derived from oil revenues and the rise of
a new cash economy presented an opportunity for further regime stability through
accessing tribal territories. The bargaining process between both the state and the tribe in
this sense is exercised by the Saleh regime on one side and the tribal shaykhs on the other
198. Dresch, Tribes government and History, 119-20.
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side of this interaction. ―The main criterion to retain or increase power was the extent to
which shaykhs supported the regime‖.201 Unlike previous presidents of YAR, President
Saleh managed to tip the balance of power to the state‘s side. Burrows identified how the
military institution was strengthened through series of reform, and gained prominence in
the 1980s, especially the recruitment of ―soldiers from President Saleh‘s own tribal
region‖.202 As power and resources are unevenly distributed, in fact concentrated at the
Saleh regime center, coordination between the Saleh and the tribes were to take place in
the capital Sana‘a or major cities thus giving rise to the phenomenon of urban shaykhs.
Interests were gained by the main actors; Saleh was ―successful [in his] attempt to
increase presence and sway over areas historically controlled by the great tribes‖203 while
the tribal shaykhs gained access to wealth and political participation concentrated at the
center of the regime.
Brandt‘s account on elite transformation in Sa‟dah province, exemplified how the
developmental projects in the province were awarded by the state to tribal leaders as a
form of economic patronage in return for the state access to this province located in the
periphery.204 The wealth accumulated by the tribal shaykh from these projects was not
shared with their constituent, at least not every time; thus creating a social and economic
gap between the tribal shaykhs and their people. Secondly, Saleh‘s political party (GPC)
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served as the political tool to draw more shaykhs into the center. Brandt‘s analysis of
tribal politics in the province of Sa‟dah displayed the dominance of the GPC in the 1997
elections yielding parliamentarians all of whom were ―big tribal shaykhs‖.205 These
regime tools created the particularistic competing informal phenomenon of urban
Shaykhs, who served in official posts such as MPs in the capital Sana‘a, but were
distanced from their social core within the tribe, hence decreasing their influence over
their constituents. Lancker, further supported this observation by stating that ―many
shaykhs became ‗city shaykhs‟ so their constituents either have to wait for their visits
home, or travel to Sana‘a themselves to seek their support‖.206 Saleh‘s regime co-opted
tribal shaykhs to gain access to the tribal territory, through economic and political
patronage which in a consequently established the phenomenon of urban shaykhs. The
latter provided access to Saleh in the periphery in return for wealth and political
participation, but shaken their societal role as leaders in their own communities. Hence
urban shaykhs strengthened the rule of Saleh but weakened their rule and influence
within their tribes. Yet again, tribalism was the medium through which this formalinformal interaction took place and in this case Saleh maintained his grip while
succeeding in weakening the social structure of the tribe.
Tribal Roadblocks
Competing informal institutions and are widely projected as an indication of state
weakness, if not failure in the case of Yemen. Whether these competing informal
institutions are particularistic or indigenous, tribal in this context, they can ―be
205. Brandt, Tribes and Politics in Yemen, 127-28.
206. Lancker, Yemen in Crisis, 214.
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communicated through highly visible episodes of rule breaking and sanction‖.207 The
evaluation of state-tribal interaction in Yemen during the rule of Saleh cannot turn a blind
eye to competing informal rules that are tagged to the tribe which in many occasions
‗visibly‘ contested the formal rules of the state. In this section, ―episodes of rulebreaking‖ will be outlined within the scope of state-societal relations in another attempt
to locate tribalism as a medium.208
The previous section tapped into the dynamics that explained how President Saleh
managed to tip the balance of power to his side but that did not mean that his rule was not
challenged or contested by the tribe. In fact, he was vocal about this notion of
contestation as one well-known quote of his expressed that ―ruling Yemen is difficult… it
is like dancing with snakes‖.209 Tribal competing informal rules, like ―roadblock,
kidnapping, or hijacking by tribesmen, also suggested that the state authority did not
always go unquestioned‖.210 Al-Abdali quoting Abu Isba‘ pointed out how ―the gun
culture of the tribe provided it with the leverage to compete with the state on the
monopoly of violence thus maintaining the tribes‘ political role‖211, and was ultimately
the enabler for these tribal competing informal rules to be sustained.
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Roadblocks have always been a competing informal rule performed by the tribe either
against other opposing tribes or against the central authority of the state. History of this
tribal informal rule can be traced all the way back to the Imamate rule in Yemen. Dresch
elaborated: ―the constant disputes between the Imam and tribes over passages on the
roads produced different outcomes according to the respective strength of those involved,
but their significance in histories is always the same and perhaps cumulative ‖.212 The
significance of roads to the tribe is linked to territorial autonomy, and roadblocks are
rather imposed by the tribes as an exercise of power against another entity being it an
opposing tribe or the state. In addition; Al-Abdali further attested that roadblocks are
performed by the tribes as a form of protest, and those do not only occur in roads that run
through tribal territory but are also performed close to the city gates like the capital
Sana‘a.213
This tribal competing informal rule of roadblocks clearly contested the formal institution
of the state and during the Saleh era it persisted as an informal rule for protesting or
settling disputes. ―From the point of view of an Imam (or indeed of the present state)
interference with free passage is tantamount to secession‖.214 Yet the weakness of the
state puts it in a situation where it has to comply with the demand of the roadblocks‘
instigators or make the necessary payments to their respective tribal shaykhs to solve the
situation.215 Dresch summarized how this episode of ‗rule-breaking‘ ensues:
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“Roadblocks are up (qata‟), access to territory is denied by men „guarding the borders‟,
delegations are formed to provide „mediation‟ (wasitah), rifles are proffered, guarantors
appointed, and arbitration pursued by the same means as were used before the new
economy came to Yemen.”216
Roadblocks persisted as competing informal rule performed by the tribes against the
formal rule; hence, yielding a divergent outcome and pronouncing the weakness of the
state security institutions that were heavily invested in by the Saleh regime. Another
insight that could be gathered is that the state recognizes, and accepts (out of weakness)
this form of tribal protest and acknowledges the tribal methods of lifting up roadblocks.
Yet again, the relationship between the formal – informal locates tribalism at the heart of
state-societal relations.
Tribal competing informal institutions/rules, such as roadblocks, succeeded in getting
their interests met, and sometimes were employed to convey a message straight to
president Saleh. Well-establish journalist Hill maintained that ―the tribe knew that the
best way to get something from the patronage network was to foment a crisis and ask the
regime to resolve it. If tribesmen blocked a road, blew up an oil pipeline or kidnapped a
foreign tourist, the president‘s representatives would show up with cash and cars to settle
the problem‖.217 This account displayed the different competing informal rules that can
be observed as indicators of state ineffectiveness and also Saleh‘s reluctance to challenge
them. The tug-of-war between Saleh‘s particularistic informal structures and the tribal
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competing informal rules are taking place under the umbrella of tribalism; which shelters
the overriding interests and opportunities for survival and growth.218
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Chapter 5
The Unbounded Universe of Tribalism
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“The shaykhs… were the Republic‖219
Using Helmke and Levitsky‘s typography of informal institutions; tribalism was, firstly,
explored as complementary informal institution ‗filling the gaps‘ required for the
formation of the modern state. Secondly, tribalism was investigate as a substitutive
informal institutions acting like a state at the local level - mainly in the rural areas- in
matters related to security and conflict mediation. Thirdly, tribalism was examined as an
intricate accommodating informal institution utilized by president Saleh to create his
‗military-tribal‘ regime complex that secured brief political stability. Last but not least,
tribalism was observed as the competing informal institution capable of discarding formal
rules producing zero-sum relationships between the state and the tribe. Diving into the
universe of tribalism in Yemen one can safely say that tribalism was ill-defined and put
into rigid frames. However, the historical episodes of interaction between the state and
the tribe outlined during the rule of president Saleh helped in establishing tribalism as an
overarching informal institution, and lucid medium that governed the state-societal
relations in Yemen.
Formal-informal interactions in Yemen cannot be reduced to tribalism, but tribalism can
be used to analyze theses interactions ever since the inauguration of the republic in 1962.
The unlocking of these interactions, mainly through analyzing events in northern Yemen,
appears to have complicated more than elucidate. The deeper one dives into exploring
these institutional relation the more entangled it gets. Tribalism was the key to president
Salehs‘ survival for three decades but also the horseshoe stampeding over his castles of
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sand. The next section will discuss the reasons leading to the uprising of 2011 from the
perspective of the tribe, which accounts for the majority of the Yemeni population.220
The Role of the Tribe in the 2011 uprising
…The tribe had some praiseworthy characteristics, such as cooperation, courage
(najdah, also „mutual aid‟), and generosity. Similarly the upheavals (intifadat, rebellions)
of the tribes were part of resistance to foreign invasion and to the rule of tyrants in
Yemen... The new Yemen, Unified Yemen, needs the efforts of all its citizens in the towns,
the countryside and the mountains.221
This excerpt from the old Medieval History of Yemen for the sixth year of primary school
briefly portrayed tribal characteristics as part of the glorious past, but did not dwell into
their continuity and inclusion into future of the unified Yemen. The tribes – mainly in the
northern highlands- under the rule of Saleh suffered exclusion from national development
efforts, and effective societal disintegration. The Saleh regime maintained survival and
growth through a strategy that incorporated tribal shaykhs as local leaders managing the
affairs of their tribal constituents. However, with the increased cash payments poured by
the Saleh regime to buy the loyalty of many tribal shaykhs, there grew an increase in
economic disparity between the tribal shaykhs and their constituents which created
grievances towards the state and distancing the tribal shaykhs from their constituents.
Brandt‘s maintained how there were exceptions to this rule of cooptation in some
northern provinces like Sa‟dah, but stressed on how ―the politics of patronage was a
double-edged sword… [which] left parts of the population virtually detached from the
state influence‖.222 Therefore the ‗new Yemen‘ headed by the Saleh regime promoted
220. Lancker, Yemen in Crisis, 36.
221. Dresch, Tribes government and History, 390.
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inclusion on paper but implicitly employed informal rules such as; the new elite of urban
shaykhs, who left their communities and moved to the urban areas. Hence, shaykhs who
are representatives of their tribe at the state centers, engaged with the patronage that kept
Saleh in power and participated in widened the gap between the state and the tribe.
This build up is necessary to understand the role of the tribe in the 2011 uprising which
led to the removal of Saleh from office, but not from the political scene, yet. The Saleh
regime witnessed moments of rise and fall and the tribe played a great role in Saleh‘s
regime maintenance. Delving into these moments in detail would be the subject of
another study; however, pervious sections of this paper have highlighted the critical role
of the tribes and tribal shaykhs throughout the history of modern Yemen. For example,
party politics, the military sector, and the legislative institution of the parliament were all
arenas of interaction and indicators of the rise and fall of the Saleh regime.
The formation of political parties was first allowed in the first decade of Saleh‘s rule,
which was observed as an opening towards political participant and offered a glimpse of
a democracy in the making. Similarly, the restructuring of the military sector and the
introduction of conscription when Saleh took office was indicated as a sign of building
strong state institutions.223 Equally, ―the establishment of the parliament represented a
watershed in the evolution of legislature in the Yemen‖.224 These brief moments of
regime rise and state building were a façade to an intricate military-tribal patronage
system employed by Saleh. With hindsight; firstly the General People Congress party,
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became ―the president‘s apparatus more concerned with the politics of notables‖225.
Secondly, the military institution witnessed reform that was geared towards creating an
inner and formidable circle of ―the infamous tribal-military complex, [which became] the
pillar of Saleh‘s authoritarian and resilient system of power‖.226 And thirdly, the
parliament was inefficient and was ―only maintained to reflect a democratic image for the
international community and to legitimize the political system‖.227 These were all
indicators that the states institutions were manipulated by the Saleh to increase his
chances of remaining in power forever, while impoverishment and underdevelopment
were becoming the norm in Yemen.
Saleh perceived the state as a tribe and employed tribalism as an informal institution with
rules and structure that can complement and substitute his formal institutions, but the
dynamism of these informal rules and structures was the very same factor leading to his
regime fall. Tribalism, amongst other informal institutions like the youth, for example,
saw in the 2011 uprising an opening to break free from the Saleh regime and contributed
to the fall of Saleh. Tribesmen, among other factions, joined the protests against Saleh in
Change Square (Mayydan al-tagheer) which was building up after the fall of Arab
authoritarian regimes in what was referred to as the Arab Spring. Their grievances echoed
in a comment expressed by a tribal shaykh who said: ―The government does nothing in

225. Dresch, History of Modern Yemen, 176.
226. Aldwin White and James Spencer, “Rehabilitating the Yemeni Defence and Security
Establishment: Then and Now” The RUSI Journal 163, no. 4 (August/September 2018): 77,
https://doi.org/10.1080/03071847.2018.1529901 .
227. Saif, A Legislature in Transition: The Yemeni Parliament, 239.

91

my province… we have our own army. We even organize our own legal system. We ask,
but the President gives us nothing‖.228
Lancker highlighted other ―underlining trends‖ that contributed to these tribal
grievances, one of which is ―rural poverty, [which] undermined the status of tribes as
institutions and upholders of social behavior as people compared their deteriorating
conditions with those of the few connected to the rewarding patronage system‖.229 In
other words, the disparities within the tribal structure, and the rise of urban shaykhs who
distanced themselves from the constituents led to further discontent. The 2011 uprising
presented an opportunity for the tribes to break free from Saleh who employed tribalism
as means to an end (remaining in power), while disadvantaging the tribes in the process.
The 2011 uprising did not only present an opportunity for the rural tribesmen but also the
tribal elite that was harmed or disadvantaged by Saleh‘s remaining in power, and
therefore mobilized to capture a seat at the Change Square. This tribal elite mobilization
was demonstrated by the defection of Al-Ahmar family of Hashid tribal confederation
from Saleh‘s tribal alliance. Hill described in detail how the ―tensions had grown
increasingly between the two families in the late 2000s‖ as Saleh was attempting to
consolidate power within his direct family.230 Al-Ahmar sons of the late shaykh Abdullah
bin Hussain Al-Ahmar, leader of the Hashid tribal confederation, announced their support
to the democratic upraising though they were considered one of the main beneficiaries
from the Saleh regime. The result of this defection by ―regime veteran insiders‖ was a
228. Hill, Yemen Endures, 206.
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byproduct of ―Saleh‘s failed alliance policy‖ that discarded the unwritten agreement of
shared rule and concentrated the power in the hands of direct family members.231
Therefore the 2011 uprising presented an opportunity for these tribal elites to vanquish
Saleh‘s familial rule and be part of the post-Saleh political configuration. While the
prostest were raging in Change Square Hamid, the most prominent of Al-Ahmar brothers,
challenged Saleh directly and mentioned in an interview that ―Saleh and his family
should leave the country for their own safety‖.232 This warning by an influential tribal
member and the brother of Sadiq Al-Ahmar, Shaykh of Hashid tribal confederation, was
enough to shaken Saleh‘s power in the capital Sana‘a. In fact, in May 2011 armed clashes
between the Saleh forces and tribal militants loyal to Al-Ahmar erupted in the
neighborhood of Al-Ahmar family complex in the capital Sana‘a, before a tribal
mediation was set to contain the situation. But when the mediation meeting that took
place at Al-Ahmar‟s complex was attacked by Saleh‘s forces in complete defiance to
tribal customs enmity was declared between Al-Ahmar of Hashid and Saleh.233 The tribal
prominence and weight of Al-Ahmar in Hashid was a one of the main factors that
pressured Saleh not to continue using force and alternatively seek a negotiated exit plan.
―The series of war in the far north against the Houthi rebels… [the] numerous localized
military conflicts, increasing tension between official opposition and the regime, [and
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the] worsening poverty… led to the paralysis of the formal political system‖.234
Therefore, ―resistance to the rule of tyrants” which is a manifested characteristic of the
tribe235, was again in effect. Overthrowing Saleh became an interest to the tribe looking
for survival, and the tribal elite looking to break free from the Saleh‘s familial rule.
Therefore the unit of the tribe played a major role in shaping the uprising of 2011. This
desire for societal change took place ―with rural tribesmen leaving there guns at home
and travelling to Sana‟a to participate in the demonstrations as unarmed civilians‖.236 But
when force was used by Saleh‘s forces against unarmed protestor in one incident and in
targeting a mediation meeting in another incident, tribalism as a competing institution
defined the interaction between these tribal elements and Saleh‘s forces.
These are glimpses of the tribal influence on the 2011 uprising; however, the contribution
of the tribe in the popular uprising is a subject of another research paper. The aim in this
section was to highlight the state-societal interaction governed by tribalism as an informal
institution. The tribe did not dominate the scene during the 2011 uprising, but tribalism as
informal institution dominated the actions of tribal members and the tribal elite. As
illustrated in previous historical episodes, the 2011 uprising presented an opportunity for
the resurgence of the tribe that was weakened by Saleh, and presented the tribal elites like
Al-Ahmar family with an opportunity for survival and growth in the post-Saleh era. The
next section will conclude the Saleh impact on the transition phase following the 2011
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uprising while exemplifying the overarching prominence of tribalism as governing
structure.

Conclusion
The Saleh era revealed the provenance of tribalism in governing the relations between the
state and the tribe. Opportunities for survival and growth outlined through episodes of
interaction showcase the interplay between these two structures, and provided an
understanding to the political reality in modern Yemen.
Dynamism is one feature of formal-informal relationships237; and the nuance of tribalism
as an overarching informal institution was illustrated across the four types of informal
institution proposed by Helmke and Levitsky. The perseverance of the tribe in Yemen is
owed to tribalism, embodied as rules and structures, which reemerge with each
interaction with formal institutions of the state. Saleh‘s regime maintenance was also
explained through the same informal institution of tribalism. However, in the last few
years of his presidency, Saleh discredited ‗group loyalties‘, monopolized the
‗opportunities for survival and growth‘, and broke the cultural code of the tribe. Elie
elaborated further on the latter point by stating that the ―political environment was
characterized by the fragmentation of social control between the state, its venal retainers
[tribal shaykhs]… and a politically indifferent population that is conditionally amenable
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to political mobilization through the state‘s episodic mass clientelism‖.238 This
fragmentation reached a point of no-return where any attempts of fusing these
components seemed to be a daunting task.
Unlike any other oust Arab leader, Saleh‘s departure from office was split into two
episodes. The first was an assassination attempt plotted by one of the many enemies
manifest in the Change Squares, one of which is the tribe. The second episode was a
negotiated exit, where the Gulf Cooperation Council presented an initiative that granted
him immunity. Saleh‘s instinct for survival as a tribesman presented to him an exit deal
that was not granted to any oust Arab leader. Again, tribalism as an informal institution
negotiated a ―transition agreement [which] kept the regime intact while politely inviting
Saleh to transfer the rein of power to Hadi‖.239 This presented another ‗opportunity‘ for
Saleh to be part of the polity deciding the fate of Yemen in the years following his formal
departure from office.
Following the transition of power the National Dialogue Conference (NDC) represented a
democratic process that included all political players, formal and informal, deciding the
future of Yemen. However this process of dialogue is not new to the polity in Yemen, in
fact it was ―an established tradition of resolving conflicts or addressing issues of national
importance‖.240 Additionally, Al-Abdali highlights how the practice of conferencestaging by the tribes has always been a political tool used to convey tribal interests and
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demands.241 The formalization of this informal rule rooted in the tribe displays another
state-societal interaction that can be analyzed through the lens of tribalism as a
complementing informal institution. ―Hooria Mashoor, minister for justice and human
rights, believed the conference ‗voiced [the participants‘] national consensus because all
political and social constituencies were present in the talks‖.242 As the NDC progressed,
Lancker highlighted that one of its recommendations was to adopt a federal state system,
which was rejected mainly by the Houthis and the Southern movement, therefore leading
to its failure at its final stage.243 The Houthis sabotaging of this formal process through
military confrontation was a display of a competing informal rule to voice the interests
and demands of the Houthi insurgents. Hence tribalism, as an informal institution
continued to govern the formal-informal relationships post the Saleh era.
With the collapse of the national dialogue and the failure of the transitional process the
Republic of Yemen is heading towards the unknown. The chaotic roll of events following
the failure of implementing the recommendations of the national dialogue can be
analyzed using the language of tribalism. Snippets of major episodes that
overcomplicated the already complicated political scene will outline Saleh‘s reemergence
and demise.
Saleh have merged forces with the Houthi insurgents helping them capture of the capital
Sana‟a, ―as their ascendency also contributes to the rout of his own opponents,‖ one of
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which is Hadi, whom he also ―denounced as a traitor‖.244 In 2016, Saleh‘s political party
the GPC jointly with the Houthi political arm famous for Ansar Allah formed the
Supreme Political Council (SPC) in an attempt to formalize the Saleh-Houthi alliance and
create ―a government in Sana‟a‖.245 However, the Saudi-led coalition that was formed to
stop the Houthis from capturing the temporary capital Aden in the south presented itself
as a major player in deciding the fate of Yemen. The Saudi involvement has dictated the
battle against the Houthis while undermining a weak Hadi government based in Riyadh;
and this has lured Saleh to grapple for a future political role as he grew weaker in
comparison to his current Houthi allies.246 Saleh‘s tribal mentality of ‗remaining forever‘
tempted him to challenge the Houthis and openly asking the Saudi neighbors for a
helping hand to defeat the Houthis in Sana‘a. Towards the end of 2017 Saleh went into an
uncalculated military face-off with the Houthis in Sana‟a. Saleh tribal allies abandoned
him and decided not to come for his rescue after calculating the risk that would threaten
their own survival. The early days of December 2017 saw the elimination of Saleh from
the political game after the Houthi declaration of containing what was referred to as a
coup.
Saleh employed the flaccid informal institution of tribalism to complement the Houthi
control over Sana‘a. Saleh, through his political party, substituted the Houthi presence
on the ground for the common goal of the alliance and to gain political and societal
legitimacy beyond Sana‘a. Saleh accommodated the dominance of Houthi polity in
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policy and decision-making in order to maintain his presence in the political scene; but
when he chose to compete with the Houthis, for a better political bargain, he committed
political suicide that did not only end his life but appeared to have dismantle the GPC
party that he left behind. Tribalism was employed again by Saleh, but this time this
structure failed him and turned against him. Tribalism by definition is founded on group
loyalties that share same interests, and Saleh‘s abrupt switching of allies left him with
group and therefore was abandoned in his final days to meet a horrible destiny.
The political factions currently dictating the politics of Yemen should invest into
learning the language of tribalism. This informal structure can provide an alternative
approach to the formally institutionalized approach that has its shortcoming. If tribalism
has governed the state-societal relations during the Saleh era, it can be further
investigated and thus employed to governing formal institutions in Yemen that are mostly
on the brink of failure because of the absence of the state.
There are multiple arenas in which the informal institution of tribalism can inform state
and regional policies defining the political and humanitarian situation featured in Yemen.
Tribalism is not limited to the tribe as established earlier and therefore state actors and
other non-state actors including international organizations can tap into the nuances of
tribalism and employ it as complementary or substitutive informal institutions. An
example that illustrates the effectiveness of this interaction can be derived from the
mechanism that International organizations have adopted in order to reach out to the
affected persons in local communities. As these organizations are working towards
alleviating the dire humanitarian situation of these local communities they established
channels of communication with local community leaders, like tribal shaykhs, who can
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facilitate passage of aid workers in rural regions and oversee the distribution of aid.
Using the same example one can also locate the fluidity and limitations of employing
tribalism as an informal institution. Actors on the other side of this interaction dealing
with formal institutions like international aid organization can employ tribalism as
accommodating or competing structures that can give rise to bribery and embezzlement
by local leaders to accommodate the requests of aid workers, or use extortion and force to
block efforts of aid workers.
History has provided incidents that have highlighted the prominence tribalism as an
informal institution in dictating the dealings of the state at the national level. Tribalism is
also a set of unwritten rules, where opportunities of survival and growth are dynamic and
actors at both sides of the state-societal interaction play a major role in deciding the
outcome of these interactions. This research has widened the scope of state-societal
interaction though the exploration of tribalism as governing informal institution.
However it raises further questions on the feasibility and sustainability of incorporating
tribalism where formal institutions are weak and fragile like in the case of Yemen.
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